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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES
by
Christina Estela Brown
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Mahadev Bhat, Major Professor
Increased potential of flooding caused by heavy precipitation events and sea level rise, as
well as growing risk of drought that are likely changes in the frequency and spatial
distribution of climatic conditions, pose particular challenges to water management in
coastal areas. Extreme events are expected to increase the complexity of managing scarce
water resources for competing water users. South Florida, which is characterized by a
mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas and natural areas, is served by a highly
human-engineered water management system grappling to meet multiple objectives,
including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and environmental
restoration. Climate-induced water shortage or excess often tests the limits of the water
management engineering system. While the Everglades suffers a lack of freshwater
inflows, heavy precipitation and flooding events in the U.S. and worldwide in recent
years have greatly damaged crop production. If model projections of increased weather
extremes are realized, the cost of crop losses could increase drastically. These costs may
be borne directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to private insurers or
governmental disaster relief programs. The present research quantifies monetary values
of lost recreational fishery ecosystem services due to reduced freshwater flow in the
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Everglades using a survey-based discrete choice methodology, estimated at over $25
million annually. Examining survey respondents’ willingness to pay for ecosystem
services in light of their perceptions and preferences regarding the risks posed by climate
change and sea level rise, when willingness to pay values were adjusted for risk
perception the annual overall ecosystem service valuation (benefit) of users was 40.03%
higher than the annual benefits estimated using non-adjusted willingness to pay. The
economic value of crop flooding indemnity claims is also be estimated at a county level
using a Stackelberg game-theoretic model, finding that in many years total indemnity far
exceeds premiums, which are set at levels below farmers’ maximum willingness to pay.
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1. Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report outlines changes in the
frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic conditions and extreme
events that are likely to occur in the not too distant future that could pose significant risks
to human well-being (IPCC, 2014). Among such changes are an increased potential of
flooding caused by increased heavy precipitation events and sea level rise, as well as
increased risk of drought, and pose particular concern to coastal communities and
agricultural production. South Florida is among the areas of the U.S. most vulnerable to
inundation (Dolan & Walker, 2006; Erwin, 2009; Gornall et al., 2010; Scavia et al.,
2002). In addition to inundation, rising sea level can cause shoreline erosion and inland
migration, and increase salinity of freshwater ecosystems and aquifers (Scavia et al.,
2002). These extreme events are in turn expected to further increase the complexity of
managing scarce water resources for competing water users. Specifically South Florida,
which is characterized by a mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas and natural
areas, is served by a highly human-engineered water management system (Harwell et al.,
1996). Management agencies grapple with managing water to meet multiple objectives,
including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and environmental
restoration. Climate-induced (flood, drought, sea level rise) water shortage or excess
often tests the limits of this engineering system.
The Everglades National Park, including Whitewater Bay, Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay,
is renowned for its world-class recreational fisheries, generating more than $1.2 billion in
annual economic activity (Fedler, 2009). The timing, quantity, and quality of freshwater
inflows can greatly affect salinity and water quality regimes in south Florida coastal bays.
1

Freshwater flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity
(Rudnick, Ortner, Browder, & Davis, 2005; Stabenau, Engel, Sadle, & Pearlstine, 2011;
Walters, Gunderson, & Holling, 1992), making the recreational fishing industry in the
area a direct beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat.
Historically, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee into a broad, slow moving
shallow river of water. At present, these flows are constrained by a dike and levy system
and occupy less than half of their original areal extent, relegating the Everglades to part
of a complex watershed management system regulated primarily for agriculture, flood
control, and consumptive uses (Ogden, Davis, Jacobs, Barnes, & Fling, 2005; F. H. Sklar,
Fitz, Wu, Van Zee, & McVoy, 2001; Sklar et al., 2005). As a result, the flow of
freshwater through the Everglades has been reduced, channelized, and otherwise
modified such that salinity regimes, biota, and a variety of ecosystem services in the
coastal Everglades have dramatically changed (Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).
While the Everglades suffers a lack of freshwater inflows, heavy precipitation and
flooding events in the United States and worldwide in recent years have greatly damaged
crop production. If model projections of increased weather extremes are realized (IPCC,
2014; National Park Service, 2009), the cost of crop losses could increase drastically.
Recent studies have attempted to simulate the effect of plant damage from excess soil
moisture in order to estimate crop production loss, finding that losses under current
climatic conditions may double in the next thirty years to an estimated $3 billion annually
(Rosenzweig, Tubiello, Goldberg, Mills, & Bloomfield, 2002). These costs may be borne
directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to private insurers or governmental
disaster relief programs.
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The following research will quantify monetary values of lost recreational fishery
ecosystem services caused by reduced freshwater flow in the Everglades, as well as the
economic value of crop flooding indemnity claims at a regional or county level. With the
risk of future losses increasing because of the uncertainty of extreme events and the
effects of climate change and sea level rise, quantifying these values is essential to
evaluating potential policy or management responses. Ultimately, my research will use
these estimated economic values within a penalty function framework to simulate
potential climate or policy scenarios.
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2. Ecological-Economic Assessment of the Effects of Freshwater Flow in the Florida
Everglades on Recreational Fisheries

2.1 Introduction
Everglades National Park (ENP), at the southern end of the Florida peninsula at
1.5 million acres, comprises the largest subtropical upland to marine ecosystem in North
America. Everglades National Park contains a range of freshwater sloughs, seasonally
flooded marl prairies, tropical hardwood hammocks, pine rocklands, and mangrove and
seagrass-dominated estuarine habitats (Gunderson, 1994; Richardson, 2010; Saha et al.,
2012). The Everglades, as an important migratory corridor, provides breeding and
foraging habitats for over 400 species of birds, but also water storage and recharge for the
Biscayne aquifer, the principal source of freshwater for regional human consumption
(Lorenz, 2014; Saha et al., 2012).
South Florida’s regional ecosystem is characterized by two distinct seasons, a wet
season (generally from May-October) and a dry season (generally from November-April)
(Saha et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 2012). While the average annual rainfall exceeds 60
inches, variation in tropical weather systems may result in wide seasonal variation and
large year-to-year fluctuations (1901-2000 standard deviation of 11 inches in the MiamiDade area) (Abetew and Huebner, 2001; National Park Service, 2009). Brandt et al.
(2012) report that approximately 77% of the total annual rainfall occurs during the wet
season, and remaining 23% during the dry season.
Prior to the development of the large freshwater drainage system in South Florida
in the early and mid-20th century, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee into a
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broad, slow-moving, shallow river of water. In the post-development period, these flows
are constrained by a dike and levy system and occupy less than half of their original areal
extent, relegating the Everglades to part of a complex watershed management system
regulated primarily for agriculture, flood control, and consumptive uses (Ogden et al.,
2005; Sklar et al., 2001, 2005). As a result, the flow of freshwater through ENP has been
reduced, diverted, channelized and otherwise modified such that salinity regimes, biota,
and a variety of ecosystem services in the coastal Everglades have dramatically changed
(Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).
As a large, subtropical estuary averaging in depth from 6 to 9 feet, Florida Bay
provides critical habitat for a variety of species, including seagrasses and coastal
mangrove communities (Bachman & Rand, 2008). It serves as a nursery for larvae and
juveniles of many critical species, including fish and wading birds (Lorenz, 2014).
The ENP, encompassing Whitewater Bay, Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay, is
renowned for its world-class recreational fisheries. Commercial fishing has been banned
in Park waters since the 1980s. Recreational fishing in the greater Everglades area
generates more than $1.2 billion in annual economic activity, with largemouth bass, red
drum, snook, Atlantic tarpon, gray snapper and bonefish providing the largest economic
impact (Fedler, 2009). Timing, quantity, and quality of freshwater inflows can greatly
affect salinity and water quality regimes in south Florida coastal bays (Wang et al. 2003).
Freshwater flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity
(Rudnick et al., 2005; Stabenau et al., 2011; Walters et al., 1992), making the recreational
fishing industry in the area a direct beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat.
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Surface water stage (water depth relative to a given datum) and salinity gradients
are strongly influenced by the amount of freshwater released through water management
structures along the northern boundary of ENP (Stabenau et al., 2011; Childers and
Leonard, 2005). These flows are regulated by the South Florida Water Management
District (SFWMD) through massive canals and water-control structures. The SFWMD
determines monthly water delivery targets for the Everglades wetlands on the basis of the
historical water flow levels (South Florida Water Management District, 2014). However,
in the recent years, average monthly deliveries have fallen short of these regulatory flow
targets by more than 80% in some months. Managers are interested in understanding the
potential ecological and economic impacts associated with water deliveries relative to the
pressing demands of non-environmental sectors (e.g., agriculture, urban needs, etc.).
The goal of our paper was to develop a systems approach to systematically
measure the economic impacts to changes in Everglades recreational ecosystem services
relative to changes in freshwater management. We developed an integrated ecologicaleconomic methodology by linking the Everglades hydrology to fisheries production and
then modeled the effects of freshwater flows on several robust biological indicators. We
quantified various attributes of the recreational fishing experience, and, finally, link the
hydrology-influenced anglers’ fishing experience to economic values.
Following Johnston et al. (2011; 2012), economic values are developed using a
stated preference discrete choice experiment, taking care to provide respondents with the
relevant ecological and hydrological knowledge essential for making informed choices to
ensure valid willingness to pay estimates. At the end, this integrated methodology allows
us to estimate losses in economic welfare caused by missing monthly freshwater delivery
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targets in the Everglades. These welfare losses are simply the foregone benefit or penalty
of failing to meet exogenously determined freshwater flow targets. These penalty
estimates serve as useful decision-support metrics for water resource managers making
regional water resource allocations. While the conceptual model of the penalty function
has been used in hydro-economic optimization (Harou et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 2004;
Newlin et al., 2002), its application to ecosystem services in terms of recreational
fisheries is novel. In particular, the flexibility of the penalty function approach lends itself
to applications to management scenario analysis and evaluation of potential restoration
projects. This study advances ecosystem services valuation methods through its
integrated hydrological-ecological-economic model.

2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Delineation of the Study Area
The geographic focus of the study is the ENP watershed, in particular the Shark
River Slough (SRS) (Figure 1). Our goal is to assess the economic value of managing
water through the Northern boundary of ENP. The relevant water structures involved in
these flows are S12A-D, S333, and S334, located along Tamiami Trail (U.S. 41) at the
northern boundary of ENP. The SRS region is bounded by state road U.S. 41 to the north,
Gulf of Mexico to the southwest, Miami Rock Ridge to the east, and marl prairies to the
west. The areal extent of the slough considered in this study is approximately 1700 km2
(Saha et. al., 2012). At the western end of the slough is an estuarine zone including
mangrove forests that extends approximately 30 km inland from the Gulf of Mexico. On
the northern end, a ridge and slough landscape dominates, with sawgrass marshes and
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tree islands along the ridges, and floating and submerged aquatic macrophytes in the
sloughs (Saha et. al., 2012; Price, 2008).
The majority of the inflow going through the above hydrological structure and
into the ENP (70%) flows through Shark River Slough, with the remaining inflows
reaching Taylor Slough to the southeast (Price, 2008). More than 90% of the flow
through SRS region discharges into the Gulf of Mexico through five major rivers along
the southwest coast (Levesque, 2004), corresponding to zones 4, 5, and 6 of ENP (Figure
1). Lostmans River contributes 33% of mean annual discharge, Harney River 32%, Broad
River 17%, Shark River 14%, and North River 3%. While salinity fluctuates seasonally,
there is an observed salinity gradient with Lostmans River at the north being saline and
North River at the south being brackish (Woods, 1994).
The region’s climate is seasonal subtropical, with wet and dry seasons, and it
rarely experiences freezing temperatures. The dry season is November through April
(Price et al., 2008; Saha et al., 2012), during which some parts of the slough are dry.
Average water depth during the wet season of May through October is 1 m in the
northern extent, and increases to about 3 m in the channels draining into the Gulf of
Mexico (Saha et al., 2012).
2.2.2 Conceptual Model
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of our integrated model that captures the
relationship between the freshwater flow and the periodic total monetary value of
recreational ecosystem services enjoyed by anglers. The model first recognizes that
freshwater discharges that flow into the coastal creeks are a key determinant of the
overall health of the ecosystem in general and the fishery habitat in particular. Thus, the
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key indicators of the Everglades natural habitat quality including stage, primary fishery
productivity, diversity, and location of fish depend on the freshwater flows (Higman,
1967). The model then recognizes that anglers who fish in ENP value various fishery and
non-fishery attributes as part of their fishing experience, including catch per effort and
enjoying a healthy natural area. That is, the overall recreational value of a fishing trip to
ENP is assumed to be comprised of multiple attributes of anglers’ experience: fishingspecific attributes (catch rate, size of the largest keeper, fishing travel time, etc.) and
experiencing a healthy ecosystem (Johnston et al., 2012). Finally, the model monetizes
the average individual fishing experience by using their mean willingness to pay as a
proxy for their recreational value and then extrapolates the same to the entire population
of anglers. The final stage of the modeling is to develop an aggregate penalty function
that captures the recreational ecosystem values lost as a result of maintaining periodic
water flows below the targets. The following sub-sections explain various hydrological,
ecological, and economic sub-components of the model.
Hydro-ecological models
We first developed models that link hydrology with fishery productivity and
overall ecosystem health. We linked the fishery catches with the managed S12 structures
flow in two steps: (i) fish productivity in SRS coastal estuaries was assumed to be a
function of SRS freshwater outflow into coastal streams and season (see equation 1
below) (Rudnick et al., 2005; Stabenau et al., 2011; Walters et al., 1992); and (ii)
freshwater outflow was modeled as a function of S12 managed flow along with other
hydrological variables related to the SRS watershed (see equation 2 below) (Saha et al.,
2012). That is, the managed flow at the northern boundary of the SRS watershed
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indirectly affects the fish catches in the coastal areas through its effect on the freshwater
outflows.
Following Rudnick et al. (2005) and Stabenau et al. (2011), we assumed that
natural freshwater outflows into the coastal creeks and overall climatic conditions
represented by the season were the key determinants of fish productivity. We recognize
that the relationship between fish catch and freshwater flow is complex. While the
freshwater flow could affect the distribution of certain species, and in turn, its catch, the
anglers that are loyal to that species may follow those fish by changing their fishing
location, traveling longer distance, and/or spending more time fishing. As a result, they
may not see a fall in the amount of actual catch in relation to freshwater flow.
Unfortunately, historical data on anglers’ response in terms fishing location and travel
distance appear to be unavailable. We partially address the data problem by defining fish
productivity by CPUE, a measure of how many fish an angler caught per hour of fishing
time, whether it was kept or not. In response to reduced freshwater flow, if anglers had to
travel greater distances or spend more time to acquire a target amount of catch, the
corresponding catch per unit effort (fishing time) would be lower than usual.
The CPUE is calculated for each of the following five species: Snook
(Centropomus undecimalis), Red Drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), Tarpon (Megalops
atlantica), Gray Snapper (Lutjanus griseus), and Spotted Seatrout (Cynoscion nebulosus).
These five species were selected after consultation with ecologists and were also among
the top species targeted by anglers surveyed (see subsequent sections for anglers’
survey). We considered fishery productivity for the ENP fishing areas north of Flamingo
and south of Chokoloskee, comprising zones 4, 5, 6S, 6C, and 6N. These zones include

11

Whitewater Bay, Shark River, Harney River, Broad River, Tarpon Bay, and Lostmans
River.
𝐶𝑚 = 𝑎11 𝑂𝑚 + 𝑎12 𝑆1 + 𝑎13 𝑆2 + 𝑎14 𝑆3 + 𝜀1,

(1)

where Cm is the catch in numbers of fish per unit of fishing effort in month m; O is the
total surface water outflow from the SRS watershed to the southwest ENP coastal
tributaries (KAF);
The variables S1, S2, and S3 are the dummy variables representing the four seasons of the
year (Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall). As the model used time series data, the error
term was expected to be auto-correlated. Notice that equation (1) is a simple additive
model linking fish catches with management-induced freshwater outflows of the SRS
estuaries. Alternative statistical relationships including logistic, double-log, saturation
function, and quadratic forms did not fit the data as well as the linear model. One possible
reason the logistic or other non-linear models were not a good fit was that, except during
a handful of months, the flows during the model study period (1991-2005) were far from
the “natural” flow targets.
Saha et al. (2012) computed SRS daily water surplus as a net effect of inflows,
precipitation, and surface water losses caused by outflows, percolation, seepage, and
evapotranspiration. The SFWMD (2005) also uses a similar daily water balance equation
to simulate various monthly surface and ground water inputs and outputs. The purpose of
our analysis was to link the SRS surface water outflow along western boundary (O) with
the SRS surface inflows along the northern boundary. Childers and Leonard (2005) opine
that the freshwater inflow through the S12 structures is the dominant factor that
influences the freshwater discharges into the SRS coastal tributaries. Slightly modifying

12

the water balance equations in Saha et al. (2012) and SFWMD (2005), we adapted the
following simplified hydrological equation to link coastal freshwater outflow with the
managed inflow of freshwater along the SRS northern boundary,
𝑂𝑚 = 𝑎21 𝐹𝑚−1 + 𝑎22 𝑅𝑚−1 + 𝑎23 𝐿𝑚−1 + 𝜀2

(2)

Where F is the surface water inflows from the SRS northern boundary, R is the
precipitation, and L is the sum total of water losses from the watershed that result from
surface outflows towards the east and south, evapotranspiration, and percolation. The
inflow F in our model closely relates to the structural inflow from the S12 and S333
hydrological structures, which is the decision variable that SFWMD regulates. Childers
and Leonard (2005) found that the velocity of the freshwater flow varied between seasons
and between slough and sawgrass ridges. They estimated the mean velocities of 0.50 cm
sec-1 and 0.34 cm sec-1, respectively. At these velocities, we expected one to two-month
lag between the freshwater inflow at the northern boundary and the coastal freshwater
discharges. We estimated the coefficients of the SRS freshwater outflow equation in (2)
with different lag periods, but found the one-month lag model to be the best fit.
By plugging (2) into (1), we can directly link the fishery productivity in the SRS
coastal area with the managed SRS structural inflows (i.e., combined S12 and S333
structural inflows) along the northern boundary of SRS. That is, we can easily show that
𝐶𝑚 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑚−1 )

(3)

Creel surveys, taking their name from the wicker baskets anglers use to hold fish,
target recreational anglers in a given fishery to estimate total catch and effort. The ENP
agents have been interviewing randomly selected recreational anglers over the last 50
years at Flamingo and Chokoloskee/Everglades City boat launch sites upon return from
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fishing trips on weekends and on some weekdays. Data gathered include the area fished,
number of fish kept and released, time expended, and species preference (Osborne et al.,
2006). Using this data, we computed CPUE by taking the ratio of the number of fish
caught by each angler to effort expended by that angler in hours. Specifically, the CPUE
was computed as the total number of fish caught (kept and released) by all anglers in a
trip divided by total time expended (hours fished by those anglers). That is,
𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 =

𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝

Finally, C for a given species and month was computed by taking the average of
species-specific CPUEs of all the anglers surveyed during that month.
The data on hydrological variables in equation (1) and (2) were obtained by
running the South Florida Water Management Model (SFWMM) exclusively for the SRS
watershed. SFWMM is a physically-based regional-scale simulation model that combines
the hydrology and management aspects of water resources from Lake Okeechobee to
Florida Bay (South Florida Water Management District, 2005). The model is often
referred to as the 2x2, as it has a 2-mile by 2-mile fixed-resolution grid system covering
an area of 7,600 square miles. Major components of South Florida’s hydrologic cycle are
simulated on a daily continuous mode using climatic data for the 1965-2005 period-ofrecord. Components include rainfall, evapotranspiration, surface and groundwater flow,
seepage, and percolation.
Previous recreational studies (Johnston et al., 2011; Schultz, Johnston, Segerson,
& Besedin, 2012), our own consultation with user groups, and our preliminary survey of
ENP anglers revealed that recreational anglers do value the overall health of the natural
area. But as may be expected, there is no single indicator that fully captures the health or
14

integrity of an entire ecosystem and thus could function as a metric of restoration success.
For instance, Ogden et al. (2014) recommended using the abundance of a suite of
waterbirds as an indicator of ecosystem health in the coastal marine environment of
South Florida, while Harvey et al. (2012) and Mazzotti et al. (2008) concluded that
American alligator abundance is “an indicator of ecosystem responses to Everglades
restoration because it is sensitive to hydrology, salinity, and system productivity, all
factors that are expected to change as a result of restoration.” The Science Coordination
Team of the South Florida Restoration Task Force established by the U.S. Congress has
recommended eleven system-wide ecological indicators in order to understand how the
ecosystem is responding to management efforts under the CERP
(http://141.232.10.32/pm/recover/perf_ge.aspx). These indicators include abundance of
crocodilians, fish and macroinvertebrates, periphyton invasive species, and aquatic
vegetation, among others (Brandt et al., 2012; Doren et al., 2009). While there appears to
be considerable disagreement among scientists as to which indicator, or group of
indicators, best describes the ecosystem responses, there is certainly agreement on the
fact that all of these indicators have strong dependencies on hydrological conditions,
particularly the extent, duration, and timing of marsh flooding (Holling et al., 1994;
Ogden et al., 2005). The dependency is captured by the inundation pattern or hydroperiod
of wetlands, as told by marsh depth. For instance, the availability of water during both the
wet and dry seasons seems to be the limiting factor for species sustainability and recovery
of oysters, spoonbills, pink shrimp, submersed aquatic vegetation, and crocodilians
(Brandt et al., 2012). Insufficient water and rapid reversals in water height either during
marsh flooding or draining have kept many of the eleven indicators below targets.
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For lack of a single comprehensive ecological benefit-relevant indicator, we used
the water depth (Dm) as a proxy for the overall ecosystem health. Further, in order to keep
the model simple, we considered the above depth-ecohealth relationship only for belowtarget flow levels, although excess water level could also disrupt wildlife habitat (Brandt
et al., 2012). Depth variable data from four observation stations along SRS was averaged
using a data set extending from January 2002 to December 2014. Depth was assumed to
be the function of surface water inflows through the hydrological structures along the
northern SRS boundary (Fm); rainfall (Rm); and the sum total of various losses (Lm)
including lateral outflows of the SRS watershed in all directions, evapotranspiration, and
percolation. Unlike CPUE (Equation [3]), depth is modeled using seasonal (quarterly)
time series variables, thus no lag is assumed. Formally,
𝐷𝑚 = 𝑎31 𝐹𝑚 + 𝑎32 𝑅𝑚 + 𝑎33 𝐿𝑚 + 𝜀3 ,

(4)

where m here refers to quarter.
The depth variable in the above equation refers to the level of the water surface
with respect to a given gage datum, in this case NAVD 88. The datum is used as a zero
point for measurement of water level. The zero point may not correspond exactly to the
ground surface elevation at a given location (Holmes Jr. et al., 2001). For example, a
location may have an elevation of 4.01 ft above NAVD 88, and a stage of 4.65 ft.
Consequently, water depth is calculated as the difference between water level and
elevation. Daily median water depth for four stations along Shark Slough (MO-215,
NP206, P33, and P34) was averaged and used to calculate mean monthly water depth.
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We detected the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the error terms of all the
three hydro-ecological models (equations 1, 2, and 4). We resolved the autocorrelation
problem by using the Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949). In all but
one case, the serial correlation was removed after the first round of transformation of
model variables. Only in the case of equation 4 (the depth-flow model), we had to apply
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation twice.
Penalty function development
The penalty in our study is defined as the periodic loss in the recreation-related
ecosystem services suffered by anglers when the freshwater inflows in SRS falls below
certain target levels (a management decision or natural shortage of water), or because of
changes in natural factors such as rainfall, evapotranspiration, and outflows in the SRS
watershed itself. Since the focus of our study is the effect of managing inflows at the SRS
northern structures (S12+S333), we construct the penalty function in relation to the flow
shortages at those structures in relation to certain target flows. These target flows are
derived from the Natural System Model (NSM) (VanZee, 1999), a simulation model that
is maintained and run by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to
characterize pre-development hydrologic conditions of the Everglades system. The NSMbased target flows therefore mimic natural hydrologic conditions prior to channelization
projects and associated hydrologic alterations in the area in the early 1900s. Later in the
paper, we will see that the targets are significantly higher than the average flows since
1990s and even larger than the average flows in much recent years (2012-14).
𝑘
Let 𝐹𝑚𝑘 be the current monthly SRS inflow at S12+S333 structures, and 𝐶𝑚
be the

current levels of fish catch. Express the flow-induced catch rate 𝐶𝑚 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑚−1 ) of a
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𝑘
species during a given month as percent change from its current level of catch 𝐶𝑚
as,

∆𝐶𝑚 = 100 [

𝑘
𝐶𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )−𝐶𝑚
𝑘
𝐶𝑚

]

(5)

Define 𝑤𝑐 as the marginal WTP of anglers for a percent change in catch, which will be
described later in the discrete choice model. Then
∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 = 𝑤𝑐 ∆𝐶𝑚 ,

(6)

where 𝑌𝑐,𝑚 is the hypothetical monetary value of the overall recreational fishery catch
and ∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 is the monetary value of the change in catch rate ∆𝐶𝑚 valued at $𝑤𝑐 per
percent change.
The variable ∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 can also be interpreted as the additional price that an average angler
would be willing to pay over and above the value that he or she is enjoying at the current
catch rate (𝑌𝑐𝑘 ). That is,
∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 = 𝑌𝑐,𝑚 − 𝑌𝑐𝑘

(7)

Equating (6) and (7), substituting in (5) for ∆𝐶𝑚 , and simplifying the results, we obtain,
𝑌𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ) = 𝑌𝑐𝑘 − 100𝑤𝑐 +

100𝑤𝑐
𝑘
𝐶𝑚

𝐶𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )

(8)

Let 𝑎𝑚 be the number of anglers’ trips in month m and 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 the total recreational fishery
catch value from all trips. Therefore, we express 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 as,
𝑍𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ) = 𝑎𝑚 𝑌𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )

(9)

Note that 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 is an increasing function of freshwater inflow. We can now formulate the
total fishery catch penalty [𝑃𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )] of not meeting the monthly target flow as,
𝑡
) − 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ),
𝑃𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ) = 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1

(10)

𝑡
where 𝐹𝑚−1
is the flow target in m-1. Figure 3 represents equation (10) where in the

amount total penalty decreases as the volume of flow increases, and the penalty reaches
18

zero when the inflow volume reaches the monthly target. We assume zero penalty for
𝑡
𝐹𝑚−1 > 𝐹𝑚−1
.

By substituting (8) into (9) and the results into (10), we can further simplify fishery catch
penalty function as,
𝑃𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ) = 100𝑎𝑚 𝑤𝑐 [

𝑡 (𝐹𝑡
𝐶𝑚
𝑚−1 )−𝐶𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )
𝑘 (𝐹𝑘
𝐶𝑚
𝑚−1 )

]

(11)

𝑡
Note that 𝑃𝑐,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ) is the difference between catch rates at the target flow (𝐹𝑚−1
) and

the actual flow (𝐹𝑚−1) for a given month, weighted by the catch rate at the current flow
𝑘
(𝐹𝑚−1
), and multiplied by the value of a percent change in catch (𝑤𝑐 ) and the number of

total trips (𝑎𝑚 ) for the given month. Penalty is lagged by a period because of the lagged
catch-flow relationship in (3). Also, the flow-induced shortage in catch in (11),
𝑡
𝑘
𝑡
𝑘
𝐶𝑚
(𝐹𝑚−1
) − 𝐶𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 ), is above weighted by the current catch rate 𝐶𝑚
(𝐹𝑚−1
).

Weighting is done because the WTP value in the above equation, 𝑤𝑐 , reflects the average
angler’s willingness to pay for a percent improvement in catch from the current fish catch
rate.
While anglers target different species during fishing trips, their preference may
vary from species to species. As there are five major species, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,5, we can obtain
𝑎 (𝐹
the aggregate catch penalty function [𝑃𝑐,𝑚
𝑚−1 )] as a weighted average of individual

species catch penalties,
5
𝑎 (𝐹
𝑃𝑐,𝑚
𝑚−1 ) = ∑𝑖=1 𝜔𝑖 {100𝑎𝑚 𝑤𝑐 [

𝑡
𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑚
(𝐹𝑚−1
)−𝐶𝑖,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚−1 )
𝑘 (𝐹𝑘
𝐶𝑖,𝑚
𝑚−1 )

]},

(12)

where 𝜔𝑖 is the weight of the species i in terms of anglers’ preference given to it during
the fishing trip. We require that
∑5𝑖=1 𝜔𝑖 = 1
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As mentioned before, the water depth in ENP is the key driver of the overall
health of the ecosystem. A change in the 𝐷𝑚 variable from the target condition is
considered as an indication of change in ecosystem health. Recall equation (4) which
connects the water depth [𝐷𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 )] to water management, i.e., managed flow variable,
𝐹𝑚 . We used this equation (4) to link reductions in managed flow from the target level to
proportionate changes in the depth variable, and in turn, to proportionate changes in
overall ecosystem health using the ratio,

𝑡 (𝐹𝑡 )−𝐷 (𝐹 )
𝐷𝑚
𝑚 𝑚
𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑘 )
𝐷𝑚
𝑚

. We recognize that this is a

simple and broad measure of ecological outcome of a management action. In actuality,
indicators of overall ecosystem health may vary from turbidity and seagrass density to
presence of particular species of wading birds and alligators and healthy mangroves
(Brandt et al., 2012). Further, the above ratio is only a linear and instantaneous
representation of ecohealth-flow response while the actual ecosystem response could be
non-linear, especially over the long term. Measurement and valuation of more complex
ecological functions and service outcomes of management flow are beyond the scope of
our study. As the focus of our analysis was the valuation of ecosystem services that were
relevant to common users like recreational anglers, it was necessary to keep the measure
simple and meaningful to foster better grasp of the measure by the anglers and others.
Following Johnston et al. (2012) and Mitchell and Carson (1989), to quantify both
intermediate and final ecosystem services, overall ecosystem health was included as a
“holistic measure of the ecosystem condition in survey scenarios to quantify this final
ecosystem service.”
The ecosystem health penalty [𝑃𝑒,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 )] is expressed as the dollar value of the
percentage change in the depth variable [𝐷𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 )], i.e.,
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𝑃𝑒,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 ) = 100𝑎𝑚 𝑤𝑒 [

𝑡 (𝐹𝑡 )−𝐷 (𝐹 )
𝐷𝑚
𝑚 𝑚
𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑘 )
𝐷𝑚
𝑚

],

(13)

where 𝑤𝑒 is the average angler’s willingness to pay in dollars for a percent improvement
in the overall ecosystem health (e) from the current level.
Combining equations (12) and (13), we compute the total penalty for the fisheries
ecosystem services as the sum total of the penalties for lost fish catch and the lost overall
ecosystem health due to reduced SRS inflows. That is,
𝑃𝑇,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 ) = 𝑃𝑐,𝑚+1 (𝐹𝑚 ) + 𝑃𝑒,𝑚 (𝐹𝑚 )

(14)

Non-market Valuation of Anglers Recreational Attributes
In order to estimate the anglers’ WTP values for changes in recreational fishery
attributes, we adapted a discrete choice model (Vojáček and Pecáková 2010), which
complies with utility maximization and random utility theory (Lancaster 1966; de Palma
2008). Beginning with a standard random utility specification, an angler is asked to
choose among three hypothetical restoration scenarios (r = N, R1, R2) for ENP ecosystem
service restoration. These include a status quo (N) option with no restoration and low or
no cost and two restoration options (R1, R2). Each scenario is characterized by a vector of
variables, Q = [X1 . . . XJ], representing scenario outcomes. X1 . . . XJ-1 are defined as
variables representing ecological outcomes of restoration, A represents unavoidable cost,
and S represents a vector of demographic variables. Following standard notation, that the
utility agent derives from option r can be represented as
𝑈𝑟 (𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) = 𝑉𝑟 (𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀𝑟

(15)

where I is the disposable income of angler; Vr(.) is a function representing the empirically
measurable component of utility; and 𝜀𝑟 is the unobservable stochastic component of
utility modeled as econometric error. When presented with a set of scenarios r = R1, R2,
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an agent is assumed to choose the one from which he or she derives the greatest expected
utility (Train 2009). That is, an agent would say YES to paying an amount A for an
environmental improvement if
𝑉1 (𝑄1 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0 (𝑄0 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0

(16)

An agent’s WTP is determined by a variety of socioeconomic factors including income,
education, and knowledge and use of the resource in question. Thus an important
consideration with stated preference is the respondent’s information set, which consists of
both endogenous factors because of experience or familiarity with the resource and
exogenous factors as a result of explicit information presented in the survey instrument
(Cameron and Englin 1997; Bergstrom 1990; Freeman 1994). To help ensure agents
made informed decisions, a number of multimedia tools were used within the anglers’
survey in our study. Two videos, each approximately 1 minute in length, were employed,
as were maps of the Everglades and Florida Bay, graphic illustrations, photographs, and
text descriptions.
Following the theoretical model, the structure of the discrete choice experiment
had respondents choose from three scenarios (r = N, R1, R2) for restoration of freshwater
flow. The questionnaire was developed and tested over one year in a collaborative
process that included the participation of economists, ecologists, hydrologists, and
members of stakeholder groups, ensuring that relevant attributes were considered
(Johnston et al. 2012, Schultz et al. 2012). Respondents were presented with a choice
card in which they were asked to select their preferred scenario, valuing percent changes
in various fishery attributes and the overall ecological condition from the current level.
Johnston et al. (2012) stress the need that a stated preference survey include a
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comprehensive set of indicators representing both direct and indirect outcomes of
management policy that would contribute to respondents’ welfare. Failure to do so
conveys an ‘ambiguous’ ecological description of services to the survey respondents. The
misrepresentation is characterized as a violation of content validity (Mitchell and Carson,
1989), which could lead respondents to conflate or over speculate the welfare values of
those direct indicators (e.g., fish catch, travel distance, etc.) included in the survey
(Johnston et al., 2012). To avoid such conflating effect, the choice options in our survey
included three attributes characterizing fishing-specific experience (catch rate, size of the
largest keeper, and travel distance for fishing) and one attribute representing the overall
ecological effect of restoration. We also had the usual price attribute characterizing
individual per-trip cost. The combination of distinct fishery-specific and broader
ecological indicators will allow respondents to value each of them distinctly. On all
choice cards, Scenario I represented the status-quo at low or no additional cost, and
Scenarios II and III represented maintaining or improvement of current levels at an
increased cost.
Levels for each attribute in the experimental design were assigned using feasible
outcomes identified by ecological models and expert consultations. Choice scenarios
represented each attribute in relative terms with respect to current conditions,
representing a percent change. Table 1 presents different levels chosen for each attribute.
A fractional factorial experimental design was used to minimize correlation for a choice
model covariance matrix, and the final design consisted of 180 choice profiles blocked
into 60 cards (Kuhfeld, 2010; Kuhfeld and Tobias, 2005; Johnston et al., 2013). The

23

survey was implemented using the online Qualtrics platform, and analysis included 600
completed surveys.
The parameters of the random utility discrete choice model in (16) was estimated
using the simulated-likelihood mixed logic with Halton draws. As respondents had
multiple responses, the model was specified to allow for correlation across their
respective responses in the panel data (Johnston et al., 2012). Fixed coefficients were
those for catch rate and overall ecosystem health, while size of the largest keeper, travel
distance, and additional cost were specified to have random coefficients. Alternative
specifications of fixed and random coefficients were attempted before choosing the final
model. For instance, we tried a nested logit model as well as models with demographic
variables interacting with various attributes. None of those models yielded significant
results for the cost parameter. Using the estimated model parameters, we were able to
compute the mean WTP of ENP anglers for percent improvements in fish catch (𝑤𝑐 ) and
overall ecosystem health (𝑤𝑒 ). Following standard practice (Hole, 2006; Johnston et al.,
2013), the WTP estimates were expressed as the ratios of attribute coefficients to the cost
coefficient. Further, the ENP anglers online survey also provided other useful
information such as anglers’ preference for various species, from which we estimated
species weights (𝜔𝑖 ) and used in aggregating the catch-related penalties of model species
in equation (12).
Estimation of Monthly Recreational Trips
The penalty function in (9) requires the latest (2015) estimate of the fishing effort
in terms of the number of fishing vehicles in the ENP. Osborne et al. (2006) provided
historical fishing trip data from 1978 through 2005 in areas 1 to 6 of the ENP, which
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mostly overlap our study recreational area. During 1978 through 2005 the number of
annual recreational vehicles (A) ranged from 32,000 (1978) to 38,500 (2005) for the
above ENP management areas. In order to estimate 2015 value of A, we estimated the
following annual vehicle trip model, representing the fishing effort. The variable A was
assumed as a function of the number of registered recreational vessels in the region
(RRV) and the U.S. consumer confidence index (CCI). Formally, the estimating equation
for annual ENP fishing vessel trip was,
𝐴 = 𝑎40 + 𝑎41 𝑅𝑅𝑉 + 𝑎42 𝐶𝐶𝐼 + 𝜀4

(17)

The RRV is an indicator of the overall demand for recreational activities in the region,
which we measure using the annual number of recreational vessels registered in Miami
Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Monroe, and Collier counties. These data are available from
the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (FDHSMV, 2017). The
CCI variable represents the people’s overall financial ability to engage in recreational
activities. The University of Michigan (2017) develops this index and makes it available
through the Federal Reserve of St. Louis website. We also tried including Florida’s
population, which was highly correlated with RRV and therefore was dropped from the
model. The Durbin-Watson test statistic showed that the error term 𝜀4 was serially
correlated. We corrected the model from autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt
Procedure. The estimated model was used to project the annual number of trips for 2015.
Total annual fishing trips were further distributed to different months using the seasonal
recreational boat distributions estimated by Ault et al. (2008) using an aerial survey of
recreational vessels and trailers in ENP waters and parking lots, respectively.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Shortage in freshwater delivery, depth, and CPUEs.
The current water delivery fell short of the target significantly in the recent years
(2012-2014) and the deficit was the highest during the months of March through May
(68.3%) and the lowest during the months of September through November (46.1%)
(Table 2 and Figure 4). The lowest and highest deficits were found to occur during the
months of October and April, respectively. Throughout the study period of 1991 to 2014,
actual flow typically came closest to target flow during the wet season, in line with the
increased precipitation during those months. The only months in which flow exceeded
the target in any year were January 1995, February 1993 and 1995, May 1993, October
1995, and December 1994. The years 1993 and 1995 had the highest levels of flow
averaging across all months. The average water depth estimated at the recent average
SRS inflows (2012-2014 levels) consistently fell short of the depth to be expected if the
freshwater SRS inflow were to be maintained at the target levels. The shortage varied
from 82.5% during the months of December through February to 94.5% during the
months of September through November.
The estimated catch per unit effort (in fish h-1) were the highest during the
summer season (June through August) for all five model species, with 0.37 for snook,
0.29 for redfish, 0.22 for tarpon, 0.77 for snapper, and 0.72 for seatrout. Ault et al. (2008)
estimated that the total number of fishing vehicles found in the ENP during the same
season was the lowest of all seasons, i.e., only 13.3 percent of the total annual
recreational vehicles estimated for the National Park. It was interesting to note that the
highest fish productivity was observed when the fishing intensity was the lowest.
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However, anglers had suffered deficits in CPUEs for all model species and for all seasons
when comparing the model based CPUE at target flow levels to current conditions. The
lowest estimated deficits were in the summer months (June through August), probably
the result the more than average monthly rainfall during these months compared with the
rest of the year in addition to lower fishing intensity. On average, seatrout had
experienced the lowest CPUE deficit (27%) while redfish had suffered the highest deficit
(41%).
The CPUEs for most study species were fairly constant from 1991 to 2002 across
both wet and dry seasons, when snook saw a nearly threefold increase from 2002 until
2009. An extreme cold event in 2010 led to a die-off of snook, with a corresponding
increase in CPUE for red drum, possibly caused by decreased predation of juveniles by
snook (Boucek and Rehage, 2013; Hallac et al., 2010) or possibly because anglers
switched their effort to red drum. By 2013, all species were returning to previous CPUE
with a slight upward trend for snapper.
2.3.2 Catch-flow and Stage-flow Relationships
The results of the hydro-biological models are presented in Table 3. All of the
model coefficients were statistically significant and had expected signs. The measure of
goodness of fit (R2 value) was higher than 0.4 for all models. The catch-flow model
results indicate that surface water discharges from the SRS into the coastal tributaries are
the strong determinant of the productivities of the model species. The catch variables
were also found to be strongly influenced the seasonal dummy variables. The fall season
was used as a trap variable. The catches in all other seasons were significantly higher
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than the fall season catches. These results are fairly consistent with results from previous
studies (Rutherford et al., 1989a, 1989b; Tilmant et al., 1989).
As expected, the SRS freshwater inflow was found to have a positive influence on
the average water depth in the downstream watershed. Other variables in the model,
rainfall, and all types of losses (i.e., evapotranspiration, percolation, and all lateral
outflows combined) also significantly affected the water depth. Finally, the hydrological
model, SRS outflow-inflow function, also showed strong results. The effects of SRS
inflow and precipitation on SRS discharges were found to be positive, while the
relationship between all watershed losses (i.e., evapotranspiration, percolation, and lateral
surface water losses) was found to be negative. Again, these results are consistent with
the wetland hydrology in general (Dolan et al., 1984) and SRS hydrology in particular
(Saha et al, 2014). By combining the results of the last model [equation (4)] with those of
catch-flow functions [equation (1)], we can link the fish productivity in the coastal SRS
creeks with the SRS northern freshwater inflow, the main management variable of our
interest. The integration of the two models will allow us to analyze the effects of changes
in freshwater management in SRS on fishery ecosystem system services.
2.3.3 Discrete choice model and annual fishing trips
Table 4 presents the results of the mixed logit random utility discrete choice
model of recreational preference. The coefficients of catch and overall ecosystem health
were specified as fixed whereas the coefficients of other three attribute variables were
specified as random with a normal distribution. We had tried several alternative
specifications with different combinations of fixed and random coefficients (Johnston et
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al., 2012), but chose the one that gave the best results based on statistical significance.
All estimated coefficients statistically significant with signs as hypothesized.
As specified in our choice experiment, the coefficients of all attribute variables
except the cost variable represent the marginal utility of anglers of increasing or
decreasing the attribute levels by a percentage point from their respective reference
levels, which in our study reflect the levels for the period when the anglers’ survey was
conducted, i.e., 2014-2015. The study results indicated that the marginal utility of overall
ecosystem health was positive and the greatest of all experiment attributes, followed by
the marginal utility of percent change in the size of the keeper or harvest. It is not
surprising that sports fishery anglers would care about the size of their keepers (Osborne
et al., 2006). The results also showed that the longer the distance that the anglers had to
travel for fishing, the less likely that they would choose that plan. That is, anglers
suffered disutility with increase in travel distance. Finally, the sign of the coefficient of
the cost variable was consistent with our expectation indicating that a restoration plan
with increased freshwater was less likely chosen if the costs were higher.
Table 4 also presents the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) or implicit price of
model choice attributes that are associated with increasing freshwater flow in ENP.
Marginal willingness to pay can be calculated by taking the ratio of the coefficient of a
given attribute variable to the coefficient of the cost variable. As expected, an average
angler was willing to pay the highest amount for improving the overall ecosystem health
at $3.44 per percent improvement, given all other variables constant. The $3.44 was
followed by the MWTP for percent improvement in the size of the keepers ($1.64), a
percent reduction in travel distance ($1.58), and a percent improvement in catch ($1.28).
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Note that these implicit price estimates of recreational attributes were derived from
clearly and unambiguously specified ecological characteristics with quantitative
measurements (i.e., in percent changes). The survey had asked anglers if they would pay
a given bid amount for a specific (quantitative) percent of improvement in the overall
ecosystem health. Therefore, these estimates are likely to be more precise and reliable
(Johnston et al., 2012). However, we do recognize the limitation of this method in that
anglers were not told what a given percentage improvement in the ecosystem health
meant in terms of detailed specifications of system-wide ecosystem indicators (Brand et
al., 2012). Anglers were left to make their own subjective judgement of the ecosystem
improvement.
The annual fishing trip model which was estimated using the ENP fishing trip
data that was available from 1978 to 2005 (Table 3). Both RRV and CCI variables were
highly significant determinants of the annual fishing trips. In recent years, both these
variables have increased. Using the model parameters and the available estimates of the
2015 registered recreational vessels and reported US confidence index numbers, we
estimated the annual 2015 trips at 44,627. This estimate indicated a moderate 16 percent
increase in annual trips over the ten-year period beginning in 2005, which saw 38,284
trips. Based on aerial survey data given by Ault et al. (2008) for weekend and weekday
samples of fishing boats, we estimated the seasonal distribution of total annual fishing
trips to ENP at 17.47% for Fall, 33.04% for Winter, 36.20% for Spring, and 13.29% for
Summer. We then equally allocated one-third of each season’s percent of fishing trips to
each of the three months of that season. The 2015 estimated annual trip of 44,627 was
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further allocated to all 12 months of the year. Accordingly, the three Summer months had
the lowest number of trips and the three Winter months had the highest number of trips.
2.3.4 Fisheries penalty functions
We used equations (12) to (14) to generate the monthly penalty values with
respect to varying levels of freshwater flow at SRS norther boundary through S12 and
S333 structures. Table 5 presents the monthly functions. The penalty values are the lost
dollar values in recreational experience as a result of shortage in freshwater delivery into
SRS in relation to monthly target levels. The penalty reaches zero at the monthly target
level. The height of the penalty function varies across the months. During the dry months,
November through April, the penalty was found to be high for any given level of flow,
whereas during the wet months, May through October, the penalty was found to be
smaller than it was in the dry season. Three factors contributed to this variation. During
the wet season, the reduction in water shortages in relation to the target delivery reduced
the penalty. Also during those months, especially in the Fall, the total number of monthly
fishing trips declined. On the contrary, during the rest of the years, either the flow
shortage, the number of trips or both were relatively lower than the levels in the dry
season.
The slope of the downward sloping penalty curve represents the implicit marginal
cost of reducing the water delivery or reallocating the water for upstream uses. The same
can be interpreted as the marginal value of increasing the water delivery into ENP in
terms of avoided loss in recreational value, i.e., the marginal value of water use for
recreation and fishery habitat protection. The monthly recreation marginal value of water
ranged from a lowest amount of $11.88 per acre-feet (AF) to $112.11 AF-1 (Table 5).
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Basically, they mirrored the extent of seasonal water shortage and the seasonal recreation
demand. The mean annual marginal value (or implicit price) of water was estimated to be
$41.08 AF-1. The major portion of the value can be attributed to the value that anglers
attach to overall ecosystem health ($39.36 AF-1), while a significantly small portion can
be attributed to the value anglers attach to fish catch.
The implicit values of water for various uses are not readily available. Frederick
et al. (1997) reported water prices in different US economic sectors in 1994 US$. By
inflating those values to 2015 using a cumulative inflation rate of 59.9%, we found that
their mean estimate of water price for recreation was $76.77 AF-1 in 2015 US dollars.
This value was within the range of the monthly water price estimates obtained in this
study. Frederick et al. came up with higher values of water for agriculture ($119.95 AF-1),
industry ($451.00 AF-1), and domestic ($310.27 AF-1) uses than for recreational uses
($76.77 AF-1). Our current study was a part of a broad regional research on water
resources allocation in South Florida (Mirchi et al., 2018). Two other studies under this
broad regional project looked at the value of water for urban and agriculture uses in
South Florida. Takatsuka et al. (2018) estimated a much larger value of water at $280 AF1

for agricultural production, whereas Weisskoff (2018) estimated a marginal price of

$2,000 AF-1 for urban uses at about 10% shortfall. South Florida sub-tropical agriculture
is known for commercial cash crops such as nurseries, fruit crops, winter vegetables,
sugarcane, and citrus. Therefore, one can expect a much higher marginal value of water
for use in agriculture than in recreation. Similarly, the fast-growing urban population, real
estate, and other businesses tend to push up the value of urban water use.
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2.3.5 Simulation of water management scenarios
Table 6 presents the total annual losses in recreational values under alternative
water management scenarios. We estimated the total annual penalty values under the
baseline and six alternative scenarios. The baseline scenario occurs when the monthly
water delivery continues under the current flow rates, which amounted to annual total
delivery of 754 KAF. The total penalty was estimated at $25.74 million. The total value
is decomposed into two recreational attributes of fish catch at $4.16 million and overall
ecosystem health at $21.57 million. We also estimated penalties under six other
alternative water delivery scenarios. If the freshwater delivery were to be increased by
50% during all the months (scenario 1), the total annual penalty would be lowered to
$22.13 million (a 13.23% reduction in the penalty).
Oftentimes, water management delivery decisions are made for a shorter period of
time. Therefore, the next two scenarios considered increase in water flow only a half of
the year. Under scenario 2, we increased the flow by 50% only during the dry season,
which resulted in the reduction of the losses to $63.37 million, representing 7.92%
improvement in avoided losses. Whereas under scenario 3, if we increased water delivery
during wet season by 50%, the reduction in recreational losses was much smaller, i.e.,
penalty was reduced to $65.12 million, representing only 5.37% gain from the baseline
penalty. This supports our observations made earlier in the paper that water is more
valuable in dry season in terms of providing recreational services.
Two other scenarios 4 and 5 were explored for increasing the monthly freshwater
flows to the historical levels (an annual total of 1040 KAF) and by 100 percent of the
baseline level (an annual total of 1509 KAF), respectively. While target flow levels are
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ideal levels to achieve, these two scenarios, along with scenarios 1, 2, and 3, simply
reflect incremental policy changes in the quest towards the target flows. Annual flow
level of 1991-2005 (simulation 4) is in fact slightly higher than the baseline (2012-14)
level (754 KAF) and drastically lower than the target (2,594 KAF). The annual total
penalties were reduced to $21.52 million (15.75% improvement) and $18.55 million
(26.58% improvement) under scenarios 4 and 5, respectively. By default, if the water
delivery were to be restored at the target levels (i.e., to the annual total of 2590 KAF)
under scenario 6, the penalty would be completely eliminated. This shows that how far
away the current and even the historical water deliveries were from the target, and the
respective losses in recreational value were quite substantial on an annual basis.
However, we must note that the target levels, determined by the water management
agencies, reflect the pre-development water flows. On the other hand, the postdevelopment levels used in the above analysis (scenario 4) refer to the monthly and
annual averages for the last 25 years. While the actual flow levels in some of the months
during the last 25 year period had reached the respective target levels, restoring the flow
to pre-development (target) levels seems unrealistic under the current natural and
political environment (i.e., due to the competition from other sectors). The target levels
therefore represent at best historic reference levels rather than realistic management
goals. For this reason, the comparison of penalties between various management
scenarios, all of which have the same reference (i.e., target) levels, makes more
meaningful.
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
An important practical insight became evident from the WTP estimates of various
attributes. ENP anglers attached the highest value to improvements in the overall
ecosystem health. The case for restoration of freshwater flow in ENP is not just important
for improving the fishery habitat (Davis et al., 2005; Chen and Twilley, 1999; Ross et al.,
2000). Everglades National Park provides a host of ecosystem services including
groundwater recharge, wildlife habitat, carbon sequestration, and mangroves-related
services, among others (Richardson et al., 2014; Jerath et al., 2016). Our study clearly
shows that recreational anglers do attach highest value on non-fishing related attributes.
While the primary focus of anglers during fishing trip may be to catch and harvest as
many fish and travel only a reasonable distance to do so, they enjoy other attributes that
are indicative of a healthy ecosystem.
As Johnston et al. (2012) note, one of the major limitations of past discrete choice
or contingent valuation studies of recreational fisheries is to grossly oversimplify other
ecological improvements of a restoration plan (e.g., defining the improvements in low,
medium, and high levels). By doing so, the estimates of WTP for fishery improvements
could be overestimated as respondents may bundle their value for other ecological
aspects of improvements with fishery improvements. Johnston et al. (2012), therefore,
used a single composite ecohealth index in addition to fish catch, access, and economic
attributes. The WTP for the catch variable turned out be very insignificant upon including
the ecohealth indicator variable in their survey. In our study, we used the depth variable
as a proxy for ecohealth. Anglers were asked to value percent increase in ecohealth,
without being given specific details on the improvements of eleven system-wide
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ecological indicators (Brandt et al., 2012). Interestingly, with a quantitative value
attribution to the overall ecosystem health variable, the WTP value for fishery catch
turned out to be small but significant in our analysis. All in all, we find our estimates to
be ecologically unambiguous and quantitatively more precise than it would have been
without the ecohealth attribute.
The integrated hydro-ecological-economic model developed in our study is
probably the first attempt at linking water management variables with Everglades
ecosystem services relevant to humans. Although our study considers a single ecosystem
service component of ENP, and thus, may seem limited in scope, the approach has
potential to assess management decisions in an incremental fashion (Fulford et al., 2016).
Past valuation studies on the Everglades ecosystem restoration projects have attempted to
measure a larger number of ecosystem services as a bundle of outcomes resulting from
large single investment decisions (Richardson et al., 2014; McCormick et al., 2010).
While such studies do provide management-relevant information, linking users’
preference and behavior explicitly with decision variables yields a powerful management
tool. Our model, therefore, has a variety of management applications for water
management, not only in ENP, but in other ecosystems dependent on water delivery. The
model outcome also lends itself to being an integral component of larger multi-sector
optimization models that examine the trade-offs among competing water uses such as
environmental restoration; urban use and flood control; and agricultural use. (Mirchi et
al., 2018). Further, modeling the avoided losses in economic benefit resulting from
incremental increases in freshwater flow allows for evaluation and comparison of
restoration scenarios, contributing to benefit-cost analyses.
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For instance, SFWMD had considered a number of alternative water delivery
plans for South Florida in recent years. In the case of the 2008 Modified Water Deliveries
to ENP, Tamiami Trail Modifications, Limited Reevaluation Report (LRR) plan, a 1-mile
bridge, other road improvements, and modifications to increase head in the L-29 canal
would allow peak freshwater flows into the park at 47% higher rates than current
conditions (National Park Service, 2012). The LRR bridge project was completed in
2013. At a 47% increase from the current flow level of 1,848 cubic feet per second (cfs)
(National Park Service, 2012) to the project goal level of 4,000 cfs, the penalty value of
the recreational fishing experience would be lowered by 13% (derived from the scenario
1 analysis).
One of the significant contributions of this study is to quantify implicit prices of
water for recreation and habitat protection. To our knowledge, such information is very
scare in the literature. See Frederick et al. (1997) for a most comprehensive list of water
prices, which are more than 20 years old. We consider the price estimates in our study to
be very conservative since we were able to account for only one major ecosystem value,
i.e., anglers’ preference for fishing and habitat protection. Other ecosystem service values
must be measured and linked to freshwater delivery in order for this price to be complete.
However, the price of recreational water use that we developed is comparable to
previously available estimate (Frederick et al., 1997).
Our study shows that the total valuation of recreational ecosystem services is
sensitive to various ecological, economic, and management factors. The total value of
lost recreation benefits is influenced by climatic factors such as rainfall,
evapotranspiration, and other hydrological factors. The estimated hydrological equations
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show statistically significant relationships between these factors and fish productivity.
Therefore, future changes in climate could have a significant impact on the valuation of
fishery ecosystem services. Biological factors that might affect fish abundance, catch and
size of keepers could all significantly affect anglers’ preferences, and in turn, the total
valuation. Similarly, the future Florida population and anglers’ confidence about the
economy will have a direct bearing on the future valuation of recreational services.
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Tables
Table 2.1. Attribute Levels in Choice Experiment Design
Variable

Levels

Catch rate









40% lower than the current level1
20% lower than the current level1
10% lower than the current level1,2
Same as the current level1,2
10% higher than the current level2
20% higher than the current level2
40% higher than the current level2

Size of the largest keeper







20% smaller1
10% smaller1,2
Same size as the current largest keeper1,2
10% larger2
20% larger2

Boat travel distance for
fishing








40% increase in the distance1
20% increase in the distance1
10% increase in the distance1,2
Same as the current distance1,2
20% decrease in the distance2
40% decrease in the distance2

Overall ecosystem health







40% worse1
20% worse1
Same as the current health1,2
20% better2
40% better2

Cost








$0 cost per trip1
$10 cost per trip1,2
$20 cost per trip2
$30 cost per trip2
$40 cost per trip2
$50 cost per trip2

1

Scenario 1, 2Scenarios 2 and 3
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Table 2.2. Baseline and target level total regulated freshwater delivery at ENP node (S12 and S333 structures), estimated
average depth, and catch per unit effort of model recreational species1
Average Catch Per Unit Effort (Per Hour)
SRS Inflows at
Estimated Average
S12+S333 (KAF)
Water Depth (ft)
Snook
Redfish
Tarpon
Snapper
Seatrout
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
Deficit
from
At
At
from
from
from
from
from
from
Target Current Target Target
Target
Target
Target
Target
Target
Current Target (%)
Flow
Flow
(%) Current (%) Current (%) Current (%) Current (%) Current (%)
Dec-Feb
258.4 593.3 56.4
0.98
2.55
61.7
0.25
44.4
0.24
38.9
0.16
37.4
0.63
34.3
0.58
30.3
Mar-May
141.9 447.9 68.3
0.26
1.94
86.5
0.24
38.2
0.17
40.2
0.19
28.4
0.55
31.2
0.57
25.2
Jun-Aug
251.2 655.7 61.7
0.77
2.80
72.4
0.23
35.7
0.20
32.8
0.22
22.6
0.62
25.6
0.61
21.1
Sep-Nov
481.7 893.2 46.1
1.22
3.20
61.9
0.16
48.1
0.12
48.1
0.08
48.1
0.25
48.1
0.20
48.1
Baseline levels are based on estimated average historical values.
Season
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Table 2.3. Estimated models of catch-flow and depth-flow relationships
Model
Variable
Snook catch [equation (1)]
SRS West Outflow
Winter
Spring
Summer
Red Drum catch [equation (1)]
SRS West Outflow
Winter
Spring
Summer
Tarpon catch [equation (1)]
SRS West Outflow
Winter
Spring
Summer
Gray Snapper catch [equation (1)]
SRS West Outflow
Winter
Spring
Summer
Spotted Seatrout catch [equation (1)]
SRS West Outflow
Winter
Spring
Summer
SRS Outflow [equation (2)]
SRS North Inflow (m-1)
Rainfall (m-1)
Evaporation + Percolation +
South Outflow (m-1)
Water Depth [equation (4)]
Intercept
SRS North Inflow
Rainfall
All Losses
Annual Fishing Trips [equation (17)]
Intercept
Registered recreational
vessels
US consumer confidence
2015 estimated # annual trips
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10

Coefficient Std Error
0.00290*
0.14883*
0.19960*
0.15909*

Durbin-Watson
1.8298

0.49

179

1.8652

0.44

179

1.9654

0.58

179

1.9768

0.68

179

1.9271

0.79

489

1.8992

0.79

59

1.8224

0.49

27

1.5604

0.00038
0.02875
0.03094
0.02871

0.00222*
0.16244*
0.13772*
0.14623*

0.00027
0.02041
0.02193
0.02038

0.00142*
0.11465*
0.16529*
0.18110*

0.00031
0.02919
0.02787
0.02854

0.00476*
0.46159*
0.47467*
0.49576*

0.00067
0.05544
0.05677
0.05513

0.00367*
0.45322*
0.51085*
0.51841*

0.00052
0.04401
0.04456
0.04368

0.36999*
0.11899*

0.01525
0.01211

-0.10740*

0.01832

0.65464**
0.00436*
0.00142*
-0.00292*

0.12955
0.00057
0.00036
0.00076

8594.26

3040.01

0.09624*

0.03503

193.24*
44,627

63.34
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Adj R2 N
0.40
179

Table 2.4. Mixed logit models of discrete choice experiment and willingness to pay
for ENP fishery recreational attributes
Variable
Catcha
Ecosystem Healtha
Keeper Sizeb
Travel Distanceb
Costb

Coefficient
0.008138*
0.021800**
0.010381**
-0.009992*
-0.006344**

Chi-square

17.49
3468

n

Attribute
Catch
Ecosystem Health
Keeper Size
Travel Distance
a

Std. Error
0.002580
0.002896
0.004273
0.002653
0.003184

Willingness to Pay
1.28**
3.44**
1.64***
-1.58***

Std. Error
0.67437
1.68306
0.93548
0.85609

Fixed, bRandom; *p < 0.01; ** p<0.05, ***p<0.10
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Table 2.5. Monthly penalty or lost values recreational ecosystem services due to unmet target delivery at S12 and S333
structures along the SRS northern boundary
Freshwater
Flow
(KAF)

Jan

Feb

Mar

April

May

June
July
(Million $)
0.74
1.26
0.47
1.01
0.20
0.76
0
0.51
0
0.26
0
0.01
0
0

2.15
1.51
7.45
6.83
3.26
0
1.58
0.93
5.50
4.86
1.38
50
1.02
0.35
3.54
2.89
0
100
0.46
0
1.59
0.91
0
150
0
0
0
0
200
0
0
0
0
0
250
0
0
0
0
0
300
0
350
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Marginal
value
($/AF)
28.46 28.73
111.79 112.11 110.26
13.79
13.39
Mean marginal value (Min – Max) ($/AF)
Mean marginal value for ecosystem health only (Min – Max)
($/AF)
Value of water in the US ($/AF) [Source: Frederick et al., (1997)]:
Recreation/habitat
Irrigation
Industrial
Domestic use
Thermal power
Hydropower
a
Assumed a cumulative inflation rate of 59.9% between 1994 and 2015.
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Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

1.87
1.51
1.16
0.81
0.45
0.10
0

1.44
1.14
0.84
0.55
0.25
0
0

1.58
1.31
1.05
0.78
0.51
0.25
0

1.81
1.55
1.29
1.03
0.77
0.52
0.26

2.98
2.45
1.91
1.38
0.84
0.30
0

0

0

0

0

0

15.46

12.63

12.03

11.88

27.91

41.54 (11.88 - 112.11)

In 1994 US $
48.00
75.00
282.00
194.00
34.00
25.00

39.36 (10.05 - 109.05)
In 2015 US $a
76.77
119.95
451.00
310.27
54.38
39.98

Table 2.6. Effects of alternative water management on losses in recreational
ecosystem service values
Regulated Water Flow Scenarios
Baseline
Increase by 50% all months (scenario 1)
Increase by 50% dry months (scenario 2)
Increase by 50% wet months (scenario 3)
Increase to historical flow (scenario 4)
Increase by 100% all months (scenario 5)
Target level delivery (scenario 6)

Annual
Delivery
(KAF)
754
1132
766
1043
1040
1509
2590

Baseline – ecosystem health only
Baseline – recreational fishing only

754
754

Baseline

754

Penalty
(Million $)
25.72
22.13
23.70
24.14
21.52
18.55
0.00

21.57
4.15
25.72

Gain in Recreational
Value from the
Baseline (%)
0.00
13.96
7.85
6.14
16.33
27.88
100.00
Percent of
Baseline Total
93.96
6.04
100.00

Figures
Figure 2.1. Map of Everglades National Park: Shark River boundary, the location of
S12 and S333 hydrological structures and the southwest outflow tributaries

(Source: https://sofia.usgs.gov/publications/papers/swdis_salmon/images/fig1x.gif)
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Figure 2.2. Integrated framework for developing ecological-economic penalty
function for managing freshwater flows in the Florida Everglades

Figure 2.3. Total economic recreational catch value in relation to flow
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Figure 2.4. Three Year Average Current Flow and Target Flow at the ENP Node
(S12+S333 Structures)
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3. Valuing Ecosystem Services Under Climate Risk: A Case of Recreation in the
Florida Everglades

3.1. Introduction
3.1.1 Effects of sea level rise on the Florida Everglades
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report outlines changes
in the frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic conditions and
extreme events that are likely to occur in the not too distant future and could pose
significant risks to human well-being (IPCC, 2014). Among such changes is accelerated
sea level rise (SLR), posing particular concern to coastal communities. South Florida is
among the areas of North America most vulnerable to inundation (Dolan & Walker,
2006; Erwin, 2009; Gornall et al., 2010; Scavia et al., 2002). In addition to inundation,
rising sea level can cause shoreline erosion and inland migration, altered salinity and
water quality regimes in coastal bays, and increased salinity of freshwater ecosystems
and aquifers (Scavia et al., 2002).
Increasing threat of SLR and other adverse environmental phenomena (pollution,
etc.) inflict significant losses on society. In the context of SLR and Florida residents,
Meng (2016) shows that people are willing to implement and support adaptation plans.
However, the extent of their support to adaptation plans depends on, among other factors,
their perception of SLR risks, where they live, and whether they are residents or not.
Obviously, the more concerned people are about future climate, flood and pollution risks,
the more eager they are to support and value an adaptation plan (Hunter et al., 2012; Lee
& Cameron, 2008; Meng, 2016; Schaafsma, Brouwer, & Rose, 2012). Studies also show
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that resource users attach significant non-market benefits to climate adaptation plan, for
instance increasing freshwater flows in the Everglades in terms of recreational and
commercial fisheries (Brown et al., 2018), groundwater improvements (C. J. Richardson,
2010; L. Richardson et al., 2014), and carbon storage (Jerath et al., 2016).
However, studies that explicitly link the users’ perception of climate change and
other risks to their welfare value estimates are limited. A few notable exceptions that link
environmental risk perception and welfare estimation include Viscusi and Zeckhauser
(2006) and Lee and Cameron (2008) in the case of climate risk reduction. Using a choice
experiment, Brouwer and Schaafsma (2012) showed that homeowners’ willingness to pay
for flood insurance depends on where people live (along the coast or the river) and their
perceptions about flood risks. Birol et al. (2009) also showed that local residents in their
study were found to be willing to accept an increase in local taxation to reduce flood
risks. Remoundou et al. (2015) found that in Northern Spain, people concerned about
SLR and ocean temperature were willing to pay higher values to protect biodiversity and
recreation opportunities.
On the contrary, a recent study in Science by Stern et al. (2016) notes the presence
of a certain degree of neoskepticism about climate risks, generally accepting the
existence of anthropogenic climate change but "advocat[ing] against urgent mitigation
efforts," which can be a major challenge for resource managers to gain public support for
mitigation (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Neoskeptics who defend business as usual may not
necessarily disbelieve in climate change, but may want to see more scientific evidence
than what is available, think it is not happening during their lifetimes, or defer
responsibility to the government or the future. Understandably, neoskeptics may not
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readily support public or private actions for mitigation and see such as an economic
burden.
The purpose of the current paper is to first develop estimates of various
psychometric risk measures that characterize people’s risk perception (RP), risk concern
(RC), and risk-reduction action (RR), and then to test how their risk perception affects
their willingness to pay for risk reduction. The case in point is recreational fisheries in the
Florida Everglades and the non-market benefit that anglers derive from increasing
freshwater flow as a measure to mitigate the effects of SLR on the coastal ecosystem. The
study also aims to assess if there is an element of risk skepticism present among the
recreational resource users of the study ecosystem. The present study follows Hunter et
al. (2012) in modeling psychometric measures of RP, RC and RR and then incorporates
those measures into conventional utility-theoretic model of non-market valuation. The
study makes two noteworthy contributions to the climate-related risk valuation literature
and its management. First, current research on the effects of climate risk perception on
adaptation and valuation is rather limited particularly in the context of SLR and coastal
resource protection. The study sheds light on how different psychological phases of risk
evolution—RP, RC, and RA—influences the environmental value construct (willingness
to pay). Second, although certain stakeholders may be apathetic to climate risks, the
impacts those risks will have on society are real. Understanding the demographic and
other differences in people’s risk perception and valuation could aid resource
management agencies in targeting stakeholders and designing programs that would
improve climate risk literacy and awareness, and in turn, their support for climate risk
mitigation (Vignola, Klinsky, Tam, & McDaniels, 2013).
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3.1.2 Estimating the benefits of improved recreational fisheries
Lancaster’s theory of value provides the conceptual microeconomic framework
for choice modeling (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001; Hoyos, 2010), which centers
upon the assumption that an agent’s utility or net benefit received from a good can be
decomposed into utilities for the good’s composing characteristics (Lancaster, 1966).
That is, an individual received utility not from the good itself, but from the characteristics
or attributes of said good.
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology elicits individual’s
preferences through constructing a hypothetical market scenario using a questionnaire.
Respondents are presented several choice sets consisting of mutually exclusive
alternative descriptions of a good from which they select their most preferred alternative
(Hanley et al., 2001). Consumer decisions can be separated into a discrete choice, i.e.,
which good to consume, and a continuous choice, i.e., how much of that good to
consume. Discrete choice experiments are constructed to isolate the discrete choice,
making the methodology ideal for valuation of non-market goods such as ecosystem
services in that the quantity of these goods are fixed for all agents (Hanemann, 1984). By
their very nature DCEs force individuals to weigh the trade-offs of present costs or
benefits, which are known with certainty, against risky future outcomes (de Palma et al.,
2008). When the price of a good is included as an attribute, willingness to pay (WTP) for
changes in attribute levels can be recovered (Hoyos, 2010).
The authors adapted a discrete choice model (Vojáček & Pecáková, 2010)
complying with utility maximization and random utility theory (de Palma et al., 2008;
Lancaster, 1966) to estimate resource users’ WTP for improved recreational fishery
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ecosystem services. Following a standard random utility specification, a resource user is
asked to select one of three hypothetical scenarios, two of which are restoration options at
a higher cost than the low or no cost status-quo option. Outcomes of each scenario are
characterized by a vector of variables (Q), and the utility a resource user derives from
option r can then be represented as
𝑈𝑟 (𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) = 𝑉𝑟 (𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀𝑟

(1)

where I is the resource user’s disposable income, A is the unavoidable cost the resource
user would be willing to pay for the improved environmental quality, and S is a vector of
demographic variables. The observable, or empirically measurable, component of utility
is represented by 𝑉𝑟 (∙), while the unobservable stochastic component is represented by 𝜀𝑟
and modeled as econometric error. A resource user is assumed to choose the scenario
from which they derive the greatest utility (de Palma et al., 2008). That is, they would be
willing to pay an amount A if,
𝑉1 (𝑄1 , 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0 (𝑄0 , 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0

(2)

While socioeconomic factors including income and education are determinants of an
individual’s WTP, it is also influenced by their perceptions of and preferences for risk
(Bartczak, Mariel, Chilton, & Meyerhoff, 2013; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999).
Following Johnston et. al (2013), alternative-specific constants indicating improved
environmental quality scenarios are used in model estimation.
Additionally, a resource user’s knowledge of the resource, both endogenous and
exogenous, also has a bearing on their WTP, thus any respondents who had not fished in
the Everglades within the previous three years were screened out of the survey,
guaranteeing at least a minimum level of experience and endogenous familiarity with the
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resource. To ensure respondents were making informed choices, additional information
about the Everglades area was presented in the survey (Bergstrom, 1990; Cameron &
Englin, 1997; Freeman, 2003), including maps, graphic illustrations, text descriptions,
and videos.
Simulated-likelihood mixed logit was used to estimate the parameters of the
random utility discrete choice model. Using these estimated model parameters, the
authors calculated the mean WTP of ENP anglers for percent improvements in fish catch
(𝑤𝑐 ) and overall ecosystem health (𝑤𝑒 ), expressed as the ratios of the attribute
coefficients to the cost coefficient (Hole, 2006; Johnston et al., 2013).
3.1.3 The effect of risk perception on WTP
Individuals may value ES for a range of reasons. Pure non-use value, or existence
value, is an individual’s WTP for simply knowing that a resource exists even if no use is
indented. Utilitarian, or use value, is the usage of an ecosystem for amenities or products
that derive both present and future benefits. For example, consumptive products such as
timber and amenities such as recreation are considered use values (Costanza, Farber, &
Maxwell, 1989). Where existence and use values have more than a modicum of certainty
attached, option value is a function of uncertainty (Pearce & Turner, 1990). Because
individuals are uncertain about future demand, one may be willing to pay now for the
option of using a resource in the future (Hein, van Koppen, de Groot, & van Ierland,
2006). The option value is a premium that an individual will pay above the expected use
value, resulting from uncertainty about either an individual’s preferences or the price or
availability of the resource in the future, and is conditional upon the individual being at
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least to some degree risk averse (Costanza et al., 1989; Hein et al., 2006; Pearce &
Turner, 1990).
Individual risk perceptions may be influenced by the context in which individuals
make a decision (James & Meek, 1976; Slovic, 1987). Context can correspond to past
experience, anticipatory feelings regarding some future state, or even to the way in which
decision outcomes are presented (Cohen, Etner, & Jeleva, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman,
1986). Stone and Gronhaug (1993) classified the components of perceived risk as:
financial, psychological, social, performance, physical, and time-related. Berk and
Fovell’s (1999) study on public perceptions of climate change presented a sample of Los
Angeles residents with sets of empirically possible and historically plausible hypothetical
climate scenarios to estimate their WTP to prevent significant climate change. Among the
findings were that respondents were more concerned with use value than existence value,
and that it would take very large climate changes from a scientific perspective to generate
even modest changes in WTP. Respondents’ perceptions of climate change were found to
be relative, as evidenced by valuation of future climate change being a function of the
respondent’s current climate. Ultimately, they found that within the range of climate
scenarios considered, individuals would be willing to incur at least some costs to prevent
change (Berk & Fovell, 1999).
An understanding of public perceptions of climate change risk is critical in order
to avoid social barriers and garner public support for mitigation and adaptation policy
implementation (Vignola et al., 2013). In the context of health risk, Mitchell (1998) finds
that beyond a certain threshold or tolerance level of perceived risk, individuals will
employ risk-reduction strategies to lower the perceived risk to or below the tolerance
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level. The argument that a higher perceived risk leads to a higher motivation to adapt to
climate change is also supported by Osberghaus et al.’s (2010) study on information and
risk perception, which builds on the socio-psychological model of Protection Motivation
Theory. The approach the authors chose in the present study to examine perceived risk is
the psychometric paradigm, wherein individuals make quantitative decisions regarding
the current and desired risk levels of certain hazards, their desired level of regulation of
each (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1984), and express their willingness to pay for risk reduction
(Hunter et al., 2012; Sukharomana and Supalla, 1998; Georgiou et al., 1998). Following
Fischhoff et al. (1978) and others, the authors assume that those who perceive climaterelated risks to be real and high, become more concerned about its adverse impacts on
their future availability of certain ecosystem services that they enjoy currently.
Concerned users will further show higher willingness to take certain actions to mitigate
the risks. Such actions may be to push for more regulation and public investments for risk
mitigation and willingness to make their own contributions for ecosystem improvements,
expressed as increased welfare values (see Figure 3.1).
3.2. Study area
The largest subtropical wetland ecosystem in North America, ENP comprises
approximately 1.5 million acres on the southern tip of the Florida peninsula, including
Florida Bay. Containing both subtropical upland and marine ecosystems, freshwater
slough and seasonally flooded marl prairie, tropical hardwood hammock forest, pine
rockland, and mangrove and estuarine habitats (Gunderson, 1994; C. J. Richardson, 2010;
Saha et al., 2012), ENP’s aquatic communities support a variety of seagrasses, freshwater
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benthic plants, and aquatic organisms. Not only does the Everglades provide vital
breeding and foraging habitat for over 400 species of birds, functioning as an important
migratory corridor, it is also critical for water storage and recharge of the Biscayne
aquifer, the principal source of freshwater for south Florida (Lorenz, 2014; Saha et al.,
2012).
Everglades National Park and its surrounding bays, including Whitewater Bay,
Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay, generate more than $1.2 billion in annual economic
activity from its world-class recreational fisheries (Fedler, 2009). Recent annual fishing
reports estimate that over 90% of boaters in ENP participate in recreational fishing, with
boaters launching primarily from Flamingo and Chokoloskee (Ault et al., 2008). Brown
et. al. (2018) estimated the number of unique fishing trips in ENP at 44,627 in 2015, a
16% increase over the preceding ten-year period. This estimate is a function of the
number of registered vessels and consumer confidence, both of which have been
increasing in recent years. Based on aerial surveys, the seasonal distribution of fishing
trips peaks in winter (33.04%) and spring (36.2%), falling in summer (13.29%) and fall
(17.47%) (Ault et al., 2008).
3.3. Survey design
3.3.1 Survey instrument
Data for this study were gathered from responses to an online questionnaire
administered in November and December 2015. The questionnaire was developed and
tested over one year in a collaborative process, including the participation of ecologists,
hydrologists, economists, and stakeholders, ensuring that relevant attributes were
considered (Johnston, Schultz, Segerson, Besedin, & Ramachandran, 2012; Schultz,
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Johnston, Segerson, & Besedin, 2012). Screener questions were employed to ensure
respondents were at either full- or part-time residents of the state of Florida and had
visited ENP for recreational fishing at least once in the previous three years. A total of
3,354 questionnaires were attempted, of which 2,949 (87.92%) were completed. Of those,
600 (20.34%) were usable, with the remainder discarded because of nonresponse to
specific questions (e.g., choice experiment).
The questionnaire was structured into three sections. The first section explained
the motivation and purpose of the survey, along with an assessment of respondents’
knowledge and use of the Florida Everglades, including questions about how often they
fish in the Everglades, where they fish, and what species they target. The second section
provides a non-technical explanation of climate change, SLR, and the possible effects of
both on the Everglades ecosystems and the fish populations. This explanation sets the
context for the discrete choice experiment, also in the second section, with respondents
each receiving two randomized choice cards. The third section explores respondents’
perceptions of and concern about climate change and SLR, both in general and regarding
the Everglades in particular, along with their attitudes toward control or regulation of
these risks. These eleven items, following the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 1987),
were rated on a five-point Likert scale. The first set of three questions evaluated
respondents’ perception of the risk of SLR [Risk Perception (RP) variables]. The second
and third sets of four questions each evaluated respondents’ concern [Risk Concern (RC)
variables] about specific risks and attitudes toward control or regulation [Risk Reduction
or Regulation (RR) variables], respectively. The data were tested for internal consistency
of the questions in each group. Cronbach alpha values for RP, RC, RR groups and all
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questions combined were 0.4, 0.9, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. The authors recognize that
the RP questions may have failed the internal consistency test with alpha = 0.4 < 0.6.
However, other groups are found to be consistent and it is not believed the above issue
has affected the Factor Analysis results to be discussed later. The final section also
included a series of demographic questions (e.g., age, education, gender, income).
3.3.2 Valuation scenarios
Following the theoretical model, the structure of the discrete choice experiment
had respondents choose from three scenarios for restoration of freshwater flow. See
Brown et al. (2018) for detailed description of the scenario designs used in the
experiment. The survey presented respondents with two sequential randomized choice
experiments, each consisting of one choice card in which they were asked to select their
preferred of three scenarios in terms of percent change from the current level in five
attributes of the recreational fishing experience. Three of these attributes were fisheryspecific (catch rate, size of the largest keeper, and travel distance for fishing) and one
attribute represented the overall ecological effect of restoration in order to provide a
comprehensive array of direct and indirect indicators of management outcomes (Johnston
et al., 2012). The final attribute was price, characterizing the individual per-trip cost. All
choice cards included a “status-quo” Scenario I, representing no changes to water
management at low or no additional cost, with Scenarios II and III representing
conditions at least as good or better than the current level at a higher cost (Brown et al.,
2018).
Attribute levels were assigned after expert consultation to determine feasible
outcomes. Each attribute is represented as a percent change relative to current conditions.
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Attribute levels for catch rate were: no change, 10%, 20%, and 40% higher and lower.
Levels for size of the largest keeper were: no change, 10%, and 20% bigger or smaller.
Levels for boat travel distance for fishing were: no change, 10%, 20%, and 40% decrease
or increase. Levels for overall ecosystem health were: no change, 20%, and 40% better or
worse. The additional per-trip cost ranged from $0 to $50 in increments of $10. To
minimize correlation for a choice model covariance matrix, a fractional factorial design
was used, resulting in 180 unique choice profiles blocked into 60 choice cards. The
survey was conducted online using the Qualtrics platform, and 600 completed surveys are
analyzed in this study.
3.3.3 Econometric model specification
Following previous studies (Berk & Fovell, 1999; Hanley et al., 2001; Hoyos,
2010; Hunter et al., 2012; Johnston et al., 2012; Vojáček & Pecáková, 2010), in the
analysis of the responses the random utility models were estimated using simulatedlikelihood mixed logit with Halton draws in preference-space, allowing us to consider the
coefficients as independent and randomly distributed for all the attributes except Cost.
Following the random utility model described in equation (2), a respondent’s probability
of saying yes to paying amount A is
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐴) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉1 (𝑄1 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0 (𝑄0 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0 ]
(3)
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉1 (𝑄1 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) − 𝑉0 (𝑄0 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) ≥ 𝜀0 − 𝜀1 ]
(4)
= 𝐹𝑛(𝑛)
(5)
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= 𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉)
(6)
Where 𝑛 = 𝜀0 − 𝜀1 and ∆𝑉 = 𝑉1 (𝑄1 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) − 𝑉0 (𝑄0 , 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆), ∆𝑉 is the
difference in utility, and 𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉) is the cumulative probability density function. Per the
logit model,
1

𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉) = 1+𝑒 −∆𝑉

(7)
1

𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉(𝐴)) = 1+𝑒 −∆𝑉(𝐴)

(8)

The observable component of utility 𝑉𝑟 for each individual i is specified to be
linear in parameters, such that
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = ∑𝑘 𝛽𝑟𝑖𝑘 𝑋𝑟𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖

(9)

where 𝑋𝑟𝑘 is a vector of K choice-related characteristics consisting of individual
characteristics and observed attributes, and 𝛽𝑟𝑘 is a vector of K parameters to be
estimated.
In the present study, respondents make a choice among three alternatives: one
status quo, and two with some level of restored freshwater flow and improved services
compared to the status quo. The restoration can be realized at a cost to be paid in
increased boat launch fee per fishing trip, and the cost of no restoration is negligible or
zero. Using this, equation (9) can be generally formulated as,
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠 𝑆𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖

(10)

where 𝛼 is the alternative specific constant (ASC), 𝛽𝑓 is the vector of coefficients to
recreational fishery choice attributes F, 𝛽𝑐 is the coefficient to cost attribute C, and 𝛽𝑠 is
the vector of coefficients to sociodemographic factors and risk attitudinal attributes S.
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Five specifications of this model were estimated to explore the effects of individuals’ risk
perceptions on WTP in a step-wise fashion. Model 1 is specified as an “attribute-only”
model to set a baseline for testing interaction effects,
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖

(11)

Models 2 and 3 then interact the ASC with a vector of risk attitudes and
sociodemographic factors, respectively,
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
(12)
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑒𝑑𝑢 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑐 𝐴𝑟𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
(13)
where A is ASC, 𝛽𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑟 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and Risk
Perception attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and
Risk Concern attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑑 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and
Risk Reduction attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Age,
𝛽𝐴𝑒𝑑𝑢 is the coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Education, and 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑐 is the
coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Income.
Models 4 and 5 interact individual Risk Perception factors with fishery attributes
to test the influence of these factors on WTP versus an attribute-only model described in
equation (11).
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
(14)
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𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜 𝑅𝑃𝑖 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
(15)
where 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk Perception and the Catch
attribute, 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk Perception and the Size of
the Largest Keeper attribute, 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk
Perception and the Travel Distance for Fishing attribute, and 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜 is the coefficient to
the interaction of Risk Perception and the Overall Ecosystem Health attribute. Each of the
above models was estimated using mixed logit procedure in STATA software.
3.4. Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Sample demographics are shown in Table 3.1. The average age of respondents
was 38.31 with a median of 35, somewhat lower than Florida’s population median age of
41.8. Median household income was very similar to the wider population. Respondents’
distribution of race and ethnicity was also very similar to the Florida population, although
those identifying as Hispanic were slightly underrepresented in the sample.
Most respondents launched their recreational fishing vessels from either
Everglades City (45.02%) or Flamingo (41.24%), with the remainder launching from the
Florida Keys (13.75%). The majority of respondents reported fishing in both Everglades
backcountry and bay waters (65.88%), with 19.83% restricting their fishing to the bays
(brackish or saltwater), and 14.29% to the backcountry (primarily freshwater). The top
three fish species targeted by anglers (indicating they frequently or always target them)
were Gray Snapper (Lutjanus griseus), Red Drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), and Snook
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(Centropomus undecimalis). 56% of respondents considered “being able to see other
wildlife” very or extremely important. Sixty percent reported being “very much
concerned” regarding the Everglades overall ecosystem health.
3.4.2 Respondents’ risk perception, concern, and reduction
Results of the array of psychometric questions are presented in Table 3.2a.
Respondents indicated they were most concerned about the overall ecosystem health and
future fish abundance in the Everglades, with mean scores of 4.38 and 4.23, respectively.
Results indicate that while respondents believe that the predicted SLR will happen in
their lifetime and they have a moderately high level of concern about SLR in the
Everglades, they do not believe that the relevant public agencies will manage freshwater
flow effectively without their contribution to the effort. Overall, results suggest high
support for regulatory action (average score of 4.12) as well as a strong sense of personal
responsibility for contributing toward actions to minimize impacts of SLR (4.07).
It is interesting to note that survey respondents scored an average value of 2.77 or
lower on all the questions that conveyed a sense of skepticism toward SLR-related risks,
i.e., “I can live with the negative impacts of SLR (statement #2; mean = 2.35), “it is too
early to worry about SLR…” (statement 3; mean = 2.32), and “the relevant public
agencies will manage the freshwater flow (statement #10, mean = 2.77). These results
indicated that, on average, sample respondents disagreed with the above statements,
signifying a lower level of skepticism about climate risk. That is, they feel they would not
want to live the negative impacts of SLR, that it is time to worry about SLR, and that they
do not want to simply shun mitigation responsibilities to relevant public agencies.
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Table 3.2b presents the differences in anglers’ risk attitude and perception across
different demographic groups. Earlier studies of general Florida population about climate
risks and ecosystem restoration (Sikder, 2016) indicate that there could be significant
variation among residents of Florida living at different distances from the coast. That
study also found some minor differences across people of different demographic groups.
The results of this study show that anglers fishing in the Everglades have uniform risk
perception and risk mitigation attitudes across wide demographic groups. The only
exceptions were as a function of gender and income regarding RC questions, and across
marital status, education, and income with respect to RP questions.
Further, responses to psychometric questions were subjected to principal
component factor analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values indicated that all variables were
suitable for inclusion, and a varimax (orthogonal) rotation was performed. Two
meaningful factors with eigenvalues > 1 were extracted and loading on a given factor was
assumed if loading > 0.5. Each factor represents a certain underlying (latent) attitude
towards climate risks. The statements or variables associated with these factors were
labeled “Positive Risk Perception (PRP)” and “Risk Skepticism (RSK) about risk posed
by SLR” (Stern et al., 2016) for factors 1 and 2, respectively. Measured (observed) risk
variables used in the factor analysis and their corresponding loadings are presented in
Table 3.3. These extracted factors closely matched the three sets of psychometric
questions presented to respondents in the survey. That is, Factor 1 carried those risk
questions that were worded as having concern for the changing environment (e.g.,
concerns about SLR and its impacts on the Everglades, fish abundance and freshwater),
and showed a positive willingness to act for addressing those changes (e.g., both personal
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support and desire for public support of restoration). On the contrary, all three measured
variables that were loaded into Factor 2 reflected a certain degree of skepticism in that
respondents did not believe the said environmental changes would be real, could live with
the negative impacts, and/or did trust the government would take care of the problem.
Although the survey was set up with three sets of risk questions (RP, RC and RR), they
were loaded into only two factors, representing the two underlying latent variables,
Positive Risk Perception and Risk Skepticism. All the four RC variables, one RP variable
(i.e., the perception that SLR will happen during one’s life) and two RR variables (i.e.,
that “government must take action” and that “I am also responsible to take action”) had
large, positive loadings (>0.5206) on positive risk perception factor (PRP). That is, PRP
factor describes variations in those seven variables (Table 3.3) adequately. Similarly,
three negatively meaning RSK variables (“I can live with negative impacts…”, “it is too
early to worry…”, and “government will take action…”) had large, positive loadings
(>0.6972). So, the RSK factor described variation in the three measured statements that
signify lack of belief in climate risk, apathy and shunning of responsibility to the
government.
To support the paradigm described in Figure 3.1, the coefficients of correlation
between the pairs of the three sets of psychometric questions were estimated. That is, the
average of scores of all the variables within each of the risk categories were computed
first, i.e., RP, RC and RR corresponding to each of the first three boxes in Figure 3.1,
respectively. The average scores are described in Table 3.2a and the results of the factor
analysis in Table 3.3.
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The authors then estimated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between RP and
RC, and the correlation between RC and RR. Both these correlation coefficients (0.463
and 0.631, respectively) were positive and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. These
correlation coefficients support the authors’ hypothesis that the respondents who possess
strong (high) perception about SLR and the possible impacts on the ecosystem will be
concerned about the said risk and as a result, might provide strong support for appropriate
mitigation action and express high willingness to pay for such action. Furthermore,
authors found positive and statistically significant correlation between RP and RR
variables. That is, people who perceive climate risk to be real and happening in their
lifetime were more likely to support risk reduction policies.
3.4.3 Respondents’ WTP and the influence of risk perception
Five different random utility choice models were estimated, the results of which
are presented in Table 3.4, with descriptions of variables presented in Table 3.5. Because
discrete choice models require alternative-specific variables, case-specific variables are
interacted. Model 1 simply examined the effects of attributes on the choice outcome for
all respondents. Model 2 is an extended model in order to test whether respondents were
likely to respond differently to three climate risk perception, concern and reduction
variables under business as usual scenario vs. the two improve scenarios. Model 3 is an
extended model accounting for socio-demographic heterogeneity. Model 4 is an
interaction model to compare the interaction risk terms against Model 1. Model 5 is an
extension of Model 4, examining the interaction terms as well as the original attributes.
In the basic attribute only model, ASC was positive and significant, indicating
that respondents had some preference toward choosing an improve scenario (moving
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away from status quo). The coefficients for the choice attributes of Catch and EcoHealth
were significant with expected signs, and Cost had a negative sign as expected, implying
that a scenario is less likely to be chosen if the cost is higher (Brown et al., 2018). The
Keeper and Distance attributes were found to be insignificant. In the basic model, the risk
perception variable is implicit and subsumed in ASC. In the model that introduces sociodemographic variables interacted with ASC, Catch, EcoHealth, and Cost are significant
with expected signs, while the only significant socio-demographic variable is Education,
with a positive coefficient.
Models that introduce risk perception, concern, and reduction (terms interacted
with attributes) had a positive and significant ASC, again indicating that respondents had
some preferences toward choosing improve scenarios. As hypothesized the coefficient of
the cost variable was negative and statistically significant across all the five models. The
catch and overall ecosystem health variable coefficients were also positive and significant
in all but one model as expected. Overall, Chi-Square values of all the estimated models
suggested that they fit the data well.
Willingness to pay (WTP) of respondents can be computed using the following
formula:
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = −

̂𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
𝛽
̂𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝛽

(16)

Where 𝛽̂𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 is the model-estimated coefficient for the attribute parameter in
question, and 𝛽̂𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the model-estimated coefficient of the cost parameter.
Table 3.6 presents the estimates of WTP of respondents for two ecosystem
services (fish catch and overall ecosystem health) under different levels of risk
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perception. For comparison, estimated coefficients of attribute-only model (model 1) and
coefficients of model with risk-perception (model 5) were used to compute WTP
estimates. Individual-specific perceptions of the risks posed by SLR were positively
related to WTP, indicating that those who viewed it as a higher risk were willing to pay
more. For every one percent improvement in fish catch due to increased freshwater flow
(a climate mitigation strategy), WTP ranged from $0.25 at the risk perception level of 3
(measured on Likert scale) to $1.00 at the risk perception level of 5. Similarly, the WTP
value for a percent improvement in the overall ecosystem health increased from $0.32 at
the risk perception score of 3 to $2.07 at the risk perception of 5. Authors ignored the
model-estimated WTP values for risk perception at Likert scale of 1 and 2 as they were
negative. Finally, RP-adjusted weighted WTP was calculated using the sample average
percent of respondents that expressed different levels of agreement to risk attitude
questions as weights. On average, 4.29% strongly disagreed (Likert scale = 1), 7.51%
somewhat disagreed (2), 19.27% neutral (3), 31.88% agreed (4), and 37.04% strongly
agreed (5) to the eleven risk questions. The risk-adjusted WTP values for percent
improvement in catch and ecosystem health were $0.62 and $1.21, respectively.
3.5. Discussion and Management Implications
3.5.1 Nonmarket benefits of increasing managed freshwater inflows
Historically, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades
in a broad, slow-moving shallow river. Since development of a comprehensive freshwater
drainage system in South Florida beginning in the early 1900s, these flows have been
constrained by a dike and levee system and by urban and agricultural water demands,
occupying less than half of their original areal extent and relegating the Everglades to
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part of a complex watershed management system (Ogden et al., 2005; Sklar et al., 2001,
2005). Because the Everglades watershed is managed primarily for agriculture, flood
control, and consumptive uses (Sklar et al., 2005), the flow of freshwater through the
Everglades has been reduced, channelized, and otherwise modified, resulting in dramatic
changes to biota, salinity regimes, and a variety of ecosystem services in the coastal
Everglades (Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).
Large, subtropical bays and estuaries within ENP provide critical habitat for a
variety of species, including seagrasses and coastal mangrove communities (Bachman &
Rand, 2008). They serve as nurseries for larvae and juveniles of many critical species,
including highly sought-after sport fish and wading birds (Lorenz, 2014). Freshwater
flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity (Rudnick,
Ortner, Browder, & Davis, 2005; Stabenau, Engel, Sadle, & Pearlstine, 2011; Walters,
Gunderson, & Holling, 1992), making the recreational fishing industry in the area a direct
beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat (e.g., Boucek & Rehage, 2013).
3.5.2 The importance of risk perception
Overall, the study results provide evidence for the fact that the anglers perceive a
high level of climate-related to risks and their impact on the Everglades ecosystem
services. More than 68% of the respondents believe risk is real, support mitigation
actions and express a high degree of willingness to pay for mitigation. As with other
studies, the individual-specific perceptions and attitudes varied across the sample
respondents, reflecting underlying heterogeneity in interpreting and understanding the
risks posed by climate change and SLR (Hunter et al., 2012). This heterogeneity was
most pronounced in RP across gender and income, and in RC across marital status, and
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income. Interestingly, there was no difference across sample respondents as far as RR
attitude was concerned.
The models developed in this study demonstrate that the determinants of WTP for
recreational ecosystem services in light of the risks posed by climate change and SLR are
complex. While individual socio-demographic and economic factors tend to be important
determinants of public preferences and WTP (Halkos & Matsiori, 2012), our study points
to education as the single most influential socio-demographic variable (model 3, Table
3.4). The relationship between individuals’ education and their responses to risk items
were both positive and significant.
3.5.3 Implications for water resource management
Management and policy decisions involving complex ecological systems such as
the Everglades are well served by employing an integrated framework combining natural
and social sciences to achieve sustainable and welfare-optimizing solutions (Turner et al.,
2000). This study provides water managers with insight into the associated economic
benefits of improved fishery ecosystem services vis-à-vis increased freshwater inflows,
particularly under the looming threat of SLR and its potential impacts on the Everglades
ecosystems, and addresses some of the classic challenges of ecosystem management:
uncertainty about the future need for action, lack of current political support, and
financial burden. Results of this study indicate that the public believes the predicted SLR
and attendant negative impacts on the Everglades will occur during their lifetime.
Additionally, that they cannot live with the negative impacts suggests a desire for public
agencies to act to mitigate the impacts, although results also suggest that people believe
that agencies alone cannot solve the problem without some assistance from the public.
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Results also indicate that respondents have a moderately high level of concern
about the loss of freshwater and the ensuing effects on recreational fishery productivity
and their recreational experience. This high level of concern regarding freshwater and
SLR may contribute to why respondents overwhelmingly express a desire for some
government action to be taken against these future risks, and why they also feel that they
as resource users should be responsible for contributing toward future restoration efforts.
As mentioned previously, this study found the presence of strong risk perception
and concern about climate change and SLR. Results also provide a clear indication of the
significant influence of risk perception on users’ valuation of ecosystem services. The
authors used the hydro-bio-economic model developed by Brown et al. (2018) to
estimate the impact of risk perception of valuation. This model allows for monetizing the
ecosystem service benefits of restoring freshwater flow from the past monthly average
levels (usually low) to their respective environmental flow targets (high). These benefits
were estimated using RP-adjusted WTP values as well as non-RP-adjusted values (see
Table 3.7). When the WTP values were adjusted for Risk Perception (Table 3.6), the
annual overall ecosystem service valuation (benefit) of users was 40.03% higher than the
annual benefits estimated using non-RP-adjusted WTP. Similarly, if WTP were held at
the highest level of RP, the annual total ecosystem benefits would be 136.69% higher
than the estimate without RP-adjusted WTP. Thus, if freshwater managers are to
implement any management policies (e.g., water allocation or user fees for restoration
purposes), it’s worthwhile to consider the appropriate WTP estimates, particularly ones
which are adjusted for risk perception. When ecosystem services are lost, individuals who
are more risk concerned lose more in terms of the value they place on those key
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ecosystem services than they would otherwise (i.e., with very low or no perception or
concern toward the risk).
The immediacy of the resource users’ experience with the ecosystem services
considered in this study (at least once in the past three years) lends itself to their having a
higher degree of RP, RC, and RA, and consequently 40% higher WTP. Thus, these
members of the public, the users of impacted ecosystem services, do not demonstrate a
high degree of environmental neoskepticism, which could impact environmental
managers and public agencies. In keeping with the classic “user pay principle”
(Muradian, O’Connor, & Martínez Alier, 2002), managers and agencies should first go
after the users who are more engaged and have a higher RP and in turn WTP, but should
be cautious not to unfairly burden them with excessively high user fees. Ultimately, these
ecosystem services are public goods, which need to be paid for by the general public,
regardless of intensity of use.
3.6. Conclusion
Results of this study indicate that resource users attach positive and significant
values to the Everglades recreational fisheries, and the higher levels of WTP suggest they
would see an increase in the nonmarket benefits for improved restoration efforts. The
impact of their risk perception, concern, and attitude toward risk reduction actions on
WTP are particularly salient for water resource managers as they develop plans for future
restoration in terms of public support for and public funding of these efforts. Public
perception of freshwater decline and SLR, concern for future risk, and strong feelings of
personal responsibility could all be significant drivers of stronger political support for
restoration and mitigation actions by public agencies, including water allocation
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decisions that prioritize Everglades restoration, new user-based financing options, and
programs to increase public awareness of how freshwater management addresses climate
risks.
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Tables
Table 3.1. Respondent Demographics
Sample (600)
Age
Household size
Household income ($)
Married
Yes
No
Gender
Female
Male
Race/Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
Black or African-American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian or Pacific Islander
Other
Education
Less than high school
High school / GED
Some college
College degree
Graduate degree
Professional degree

n

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

597
594
566
n
303
295
n
339
260
n
454
91
55
15
10
13
n
14
118
145
226
63
33

38.31
2.90
64,434
%
50.67
49.33
%
56.59
43.41
%
71.16
14.26
8.62
2.35
1.57
2.04
%
2.34
19.70
24.21
37.73
10.52
5.51

35
3
50,000

14.53
1.31
42,002

18
1
20,000

85
10
240,000
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Table 3.2a. Risk Perception, Concern and Attitude towards Risk Reduction
Perception of risks

n

Mean

Std. Dev.

(1) I believe that the predicted SLR will happen during my
lifetime

599

3.57

1.10

(2) I can live with the negative impacts of SLR on the
Everglades fisheries and my recreational experience

599

2.45

1.18

(3) It is too early to worry about SLR and the future generation
will know how to handle the situation better

599

2.32

1.22

n

Mean

Std. Dev.

(4) Regarding the SLR in the Everglades

600

3.90

1.07

(5) Regarding declining freshwater flow and increasing salinity

600

4.11

0.99

(6) For future fish abundance in the Everglades

600

4.23

0.93

(7) Regarding the overall ecosystem health

598

4.38

0.93

n

Mean

Std. Dev.

(8) Government agencies must start to take actions to increase
the freshwater flow in the Everglades

600

4.12

1.03

(9) As a citizen or resource user, I am also responsible for
contributing towards the actions to minimize the impacts of SLR

600

4.07

0.96

(10) The relevant public agencies will manage the freshwater
flow effectively without my contribution to the effort

597

2.77

1.25

(11) Any human activities that adversely influence the quality of
the Everglades health should be regulated

600

4.05

0.99

Concern about specific risks

Risk Reduction or Regulation
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Table 3.2b. Risk Perception, Concern and Reduction Preferences across Different
Demographic Groups1
Demographic
Characteristics
Florida resident
F
P
Married
F
P
Gender
F
P
Race

Yes
No

295
303

Female
Male

260
379

White
Hispanic
African
American
American
Indian
Asian or
Pacific
Islander
Other

422
85

Risk Perception
(Out of a Max
Score of 15)
10.8
11.3
0.296
0.586
11
10.6
3.892
0.021
10.6
11
2.056
0.129
10.9
10.5

55

10.6

16.2

15.1

14

11.3

15.9

14.8

10
13

10.4
11
0.571
0.722

16.9
15.8
0.722
0.607

15.1
15.2
0.797
0.552

12

10.2

15.4

15.5

110

10.4

16.3

15.1

136

10.6

16.5

15.5

218

11

16.9

15.8

58

11.2

17.1

15.3

30

11.3
2.12
0.062

16.9
1.052
0.386

15.3
0.848
0.516

2.145
0.011

1.72
0.053

1.274
0.224

Levels
Yes
No

n
570
6

F
P
Education

Less than
high school
High
school/GED
Some
college
College
degree
Graduate
degree
Professional
degree

F
P
Income2
F
P

84

Risk Concern
(Out of a Max
Score of 20)
16.6
17.8
0.759
0.384
16.7
16.5
0.703
0.495
16.3
16.9
3.097
0.046
16.8
16.4

Risk Reduction
(Out of a Max
Score of 20)
15.5
16.6
0.83
0.363
15.4
15.5
1.22
0.296
15.4
15.5
1.475
0.23
15.6
15.2

1

In this table, the original respondents’ scores of statements that reflect skepticism towards risk (statement
# 2, 3 and 10 of Table 2a) are reversed on the scale of 1 to 5 before being grouped with other statements in
the respective category and the average value for the group is computed.
2
For brevity, only F statistic values are reported.

Table 3.3. Results of Explanatory Factor Analysis
Shaded boxes show items loading on each factor with loadings > 0.5.
Factor 1
(Positive Risk
Perception)

Factor 2
(Risk
Skepticism)

Concern about SLR and its impact in the Everglades
Concern about SLR and declining freshwater flow and increasing
salinity
Concern about SLR and its impact on future fish abundance in the
Everglades
Concern about SLR and its impact on overall ecosystem health
I believe that the predicted SLR will happen during my lifetime
Government agencies must start to take actions to increase the
freshwater flow in the Everglades
As a citizen or resource user, I am also responsible for contributing
towards the actions to minimize the impacts of SLR
Any human activities that adversely influence the quality of the
Everglades health should be regulated
I can live with the negative impacts of SLR on the Everglades
fisheries and my recreational experience
It is too early to worry about SLR and the future generation will
know how to handle the situation better
The relevant public agencies will manage the freshwater flow
effectively without my contribution to the effort

0.7832

-0.0210

0.8409

-0.0428

0.8237

-0.0967

0.8073
0.5206

-0.0453
-0.2866

0.7766

-0.1019

0.7266

-0.0738

0.6674

-0.2352

0.3481

0.7180

0.4009

0.6972

0.1011

0.7731

Eigenvalue

4.79053

1.76617

Variable
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Table 3.4. Results of Mixed Logit Model

ASC
Cost
Catch
Keeper
Distance
EcoHealth

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

2.5661***
(0.40324)
-0.0200***
(0.0041)
0.0095***
(0.0037)
0.0015
(0.0049)
0.0006
(0.0030)
0.0174***
(0.0045)

-5.0811***
(0.9900)
-0.0181***
(0.0036)
0.0085**
(0.0032)
0.0024
(0.0044)
-0.00002
(0.0027)
0.0151***
(0.0038)
1.0753***
(0.2573)
0.5912**
(0.2450)
0.2960
(0.2292)

0.6338
(0.0268)
-0.0203***
(0.0039)
0.0095**
(0.0036)
0.0025
(0.0049)
0.0011
(0.0029)
0.0172***
(0.0043)

2.189***
(0.3955)
-0.0185***
(0.0036)

2.4309***
(0.3851)
-0.0204***
(0.0041)
-0.0177
(0.0160)
-0.511
(0.0226)
0.0356**
(0.0136)
-0.0472**
(0.0174)

0.0026**
(0.0009)
0.0014
(0.0012)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
0.0052***
(0.0010)

0.0076*
(0.0043)
0.0145**
(0.0061)
-0.0097***
(0.0037)
0.0179***
(0.0049)

578
61.94
-1088.7186

578
65.30
-1066.0773

ASC*Perception
ASC*Concern
ASC*Reduction

0.0268
(0.0179)
0.3847*
(0.2315)
0.0199
(0.1563)

ASC*Age
ASC*Education
ASC*Income
Perception*Catch
Perception*Keeper
Perception*Distance
Perception*EcoHealth
Observations
LR chi2
Log-likelihood

578
82.73
-1094.227

578
52.98
-1062.1834

578
86.40
-1082.9052

Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5. Regression Variables
Variable
ASC
Cost
Catch
Keeper
Distance
EcoHealth
Perception
Concern
Reduction
Age
Education
Income

Description
Alternative specific constant
Additional per-trip cost
Catch rate
Size of the largest keeper
Travel distance for fishing
Overall ecosystem health
Perception of the risks posed by SLR and climate change
Level of concern about specific risks
Attitudes and preferences toward risk reduction and regulation
Respondent age (in years)
Level of education
Annual household income

Table 3.6. Marginal WTP Results at Various Levels of Risk Perception
Model 1
Attributes
only
Model ($)
Risk Perception
Catch WTP
EcoHealth WTP

$0.47
$0.87

Model 5
Attributes-Interacted with Risk Perception Model

̅̅̅̅ =
𝑅𝑃
3.6

1a

2a

3

4

5

$0.47
$0.85

$0.00
$0.00

$0.00
$0.00

$0.25
$0.32

$0.62
$1.20

$1.00
$2.07

a

Riskweighted
Average
WTPb
$0.62
$1.21

Computed WTP values were negative at risk perception levels of Likert scale 1 and 2. Since negative
WTP values (disutility from improved attributes) seem unrealistic, authors discard those values and assume
WTP values to be zero at risk perception levels of 1 and 2.
b
Risk-weighted average WTP values are computed by using average percent of respondents expressing
different levels ( 1 to 5) of agreement to all risk questions as weights. On an average, 4.29% strongly
disagreed (Likert scale = 1), 7.51% somewhat disagreed (2), 19.27% neutral (3), 31.88% agreed (4), and
37.04% strongly agreed (5) to the eleven risk questions.
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Table 3.7. Effect of accounting for risk perception on the anglers’ estimated benefit
from improved recreational services in ENP
Estimated Recreational Benefits from
Restoring Freshwater Flow at Quarterly
Target Levels Using
RiskRiskHighest Risk
unadjusted
adjusted
Perception
WTP
WTP
Level WTP
Fish WTP ($/% additional catch)
0.47
0.62
1.00
EcoHealth WTP ($/% improvement)
0.85
1.21
2.07
Quarterly benefits:
Dec - Feb
Mar - May
Jun - Aug
Sep - Nov
Sum
Difference between risk perceptionadjusted and unadjusted ($)

1,502,326
3,803,337
704,106
845,053
6,854,822

2,089,681
5,372,410
975,280
1,161,589
9,598,960
2,744,138
(40.03%)

3,514,415
9,139,190
1,635,025
1,936,027
16,224,657
9,369,835
(136.69%)

Figures
Figure 3.1. Psychometric risk perception-concern-mitigation paradigm adapted
from Fischoff et al. (1978)
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4. A Game-Theoretic Model of Crop Flood Indemnity in South Florida

4.1. Introduction
Changes in the frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic
conditions and extreme events are likely to occur in the not too distant future and could
pose significant risks to human well-being (IPCC 2014). Among such changes are an
increased potential of flooding due to increased heavy precipitation events and
accelerated sea level rise, posing particular concern to coastal communities and
agricultural production. South Florida is among the areas of the U.S. most vulnerable to
inundation (Gornall et al. 2010; Erwin 2009; Dolan and Walker 2006; Scavia et al. 2002).
In addition to inundation, rising sea level can increase salinity of freshwater ecosystems
and aquifers (Scavia et al. 2002). A mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas, and
natural areas, South Florida is served by a highly human-engineered water management
system (Harwell et al. 1996). Management agencies grapple with managing water to meet
multiple objectives, including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and
environmental restoration. Climate-induced (e.g., flood, drought, sea level rise) water
shortage or excess often tests the limits of this engineering system, and extreme events
are in turn expected to further increase the complexity of managing water resources for
competing users.
Heavy precipitation and flooding events in the United States and worldwide in recent
years have greatly damaged crop production. If model projections of increased weather
extremes are realized (National Park Service 2009; IPCC 2014), the cost of crop losses
could increase drastically. Recent studies have attempted to simulate the amount of plant
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damage from excess soil moisture in order to estimate crop production loss, and found
that these losses under current climatic conditions might double in the next thirty years to
an estimated $3 billion annually (Rosenzweig et al. 2002). In 2017, up to 7,000 acres of
agricultural land in the southern portions of Florida experienced storm surge with salt
water inundation during Hurricane Irma, with the Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services estimating losses at over $30 million (Alvarez 2017). The costs of
this and other losses may be borne directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to
private insurers or governmental disaster relief programs.
As the expected level and intensity of flood and heavy precipitation events increase, the
amount of indemnities paid upon losses due to these events would also increase. Thus,
crop insurance claims can serve as a metric of the climate-related vulnerability of
agriculture. To develop such a metric, it is necessary to study how crop insurance
decisions are made. Participation patterns have shifted as new insurance products have
expanded farmers’ choices of types and levels of coverage, and the literature shows a
variety of factors influencing farmers’ choices among available crop insurance products
(Makki and Somwaru 2006, 2001; Sherrick et al. 2004; Smith and Baquet 1996;
Moschini and Hennessy 2001). Chief among these factors is the level of risk, followed by
the cost of insurance, and the level of premium subsidy.
Frameworks for evaluating farmers’ crop insurance decisions typically employ the
standard assumption that farmers will maximize the utility of their net revenue subject to
physical and technical constraints (Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman 1997; Sherrick et al.
2004; Smith and Baquet 1996; Shaik and Atwood 2017; O. Mahul 1999; Keith H. Coble
and Knight 2002). These studies show that the levels of insurance premium and
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government subsidy are the two key determinants of farmers’ participation.
Nevertheless, these two rates are policy decisions made by Risk Management Services
(RMS) of USDA each year. RMS grapples with the actuarial decision of optimizing
insurance and subsidy rates such that net insurance premium creates enough incentive for
farmers to purchase insurance protection, while private crop insurers are able to
indemnify crop losses year after year adequately. This would require that either
premiums, farmers’ participation, or both are high enough to generate enough premium
income to cover losses. However, farmers’ participation level varies inversely with the
premium. Furthermore, as the expected level and intensity of flood and heavy
precipitation events increase, the amount of indemnities paid upon losses due to these
events would also increase. Therefore, ultimate solvency of crop insurance market and
climate-related crop risk reduction depend on the interactive decisions of RMS, farmers,
and private insurers, under increasing level of climate-induced crop perils.
This paper links the occurrence of flooding events and crop insurance indemnity claims
by simulating farmers’ decision behavior of whether to purchase crop insurance and their
choices among alternative products, considering varying risk of perils due to climate
change and sea level rise. Government agricultural policy development and farmer
response are modeled as a hierarchical Stackelberg leader-follower game-theoretic
decision process (Bhat, Alexander, and English 1998; Bulut 2017). Hierarchical games
are multi-level games with at least two players at each level. Such games can be either
cooperative, in which negotiation between players is permitted, or non-cooperative, in
which players make decisions independently. In our model, government is assumed to be
the dominant player, or leader, choosing an optimal crop insurance premium and subsidy
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in order to optimize the participation response of the subordinate player, or follower, in
this game represented by farmers. Ultimately, this paper seeks to understand the
implications of funding insurance subsidies, how subsidy policies can influence
participation rates, and setting premium prices for adequate participation by farmers and
on private insurers’ underwriting ability. The model is applied to two specialty crops in
South Florida, which is predominant in sub-tropical agriculture, prone to tropical storms,
and one of the least studied regions from a crop insurance point of view.
4.1.1. Crop Insurance
Due to a host of stochastic factors, including climatic conditions, agricultural production
and specifically crop production has been characterized as volatile and risky (van
Asseldonk, Meuwissen, and Huirne 2003; Joy Harwood et al. 1999). Dismukes (2002)
states that “its economic returns are subject to events beyond a farmer’s control,” citing
the examples of market conditions as well as rainfall, temperature, other weather
conditions, plant disease, and insect infestations. The U.S. government has instituted
various policies and programs in an attempt to assist farmers in managing these risks,
starting as early as the 1930s, making payments to farmers in times of low prices and
providing disaster assistance payments and crop insurance (Glauber and Collins 2002;
Smith and Goodwin 2006; Dismukes 2002).
Since the 1930s, the federal crop insurance program has been an important agricultural
policy instrument (Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone 2003). The U.S. Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) operates the federally subsidized Multiple Peril Crop
Insurance (MPCI) Program. The 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act overhauled the MPCI
program with the intention to reduce the need for large-scale ad hoc disaster relief
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programs, expanding coverage access across crops and regions and establishing a target
participation rate of 50% of planted acreage (Smith and Baquet 1996). The Federal Crop
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 again
restructured the crop insurance program, increasing premium subsidies mainly at lower
insurance coverage levels then at higher coverage levels, respectively. The Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 further increased premium subsidy rated for
certain insurable units of land. According to Collins and Bulut (2011), these progressive
increases in premium subsidies stimulated higher and more diverse participation over
time, improving the MPCI program’s actuarial performance by “reducing adverse
selection and enhancing underwriting and ratemaking.” According to Coble (2002), high
participation rate reflects farmers’ acceptance of MPCI, and “has been a priority of policy
makers and program administrators… [due to] the widely held belief that MPCI cannot
effectively substitute for other forms of federal crop disaster relief unless a large
proportion of farmers are insured.”
Bulut (2017) cites four reasons for government support of crop insurance. Because crop
insurance risks are systemic, they may result in missing markets (Duncan and Myers
2000). This discourages government use of ad hoc disaster payments, which discourage
the purchase of crop insurance (United States Government Accountability Office 2014;
van Asseldonk, Meuwissen, and Huirne 2003; Innes 2003). Additionally, asymmetric
information, causing moral hazard and adverse selection problems, can lead to
underinsurance market failure (Nelson and Loehman 1987). Lastly, farmers may be
optimistically biased, systematically underestimating the risk of losses such as those
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caused by natural disasters (D. R. Just 2002; Oliver Mahul and Stutley 2010; K. H. Coble
and Barnett 2013).
Knight and Coble (1997) undertook a survey of crop insurance literature from 1980
through 1997, examining econometric research conducted at both farm and aggregate
levels. Farm-level models of demand for crop insurance, following Calvin (1992),
typically strive to explain farmers’ decision of whether to purchase insurance, or,
following Smith and Baquet (1996), study the decisions of both whether to purchase and
how much to insure. When taking an aggregate approach, such as at the county- or statelevel, as in Goodwin (1993), studies generally seek to explain the proportion of either
land coverage or farmers choosing to insure. Recent studies, such as Richards (2000),
have examined not only how much land a farmer chooses to insure but also the level of
coverage they purchase.
Studies at the farm level have taken a variety of approaches to incorporate some measure
of return to or cost of insurance. For example, while Calvin (1996) and Coble et al.
(1996) incorporated the expected return to insurance, Just and Calvin (1990) calculated
the quasi-rent resulting from insurance. Both Goodwin and Kastens (1993) and Smith and
Baquet (1996) follow Goodwin (1993) in incorporating the MPCI premium, as does this
study. These previous studies using premium rate found negative effects on participation
and quantity of coverage.
While our study incorporates the MPCI premium to analyze participation, we do so using
aggregate county-level data to estimate MPCI participation, following similarly to
Gardner and Kramer (1986), and Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan (1990). Gardner and
Kramer (1986) found that at the aggregate level, the expected rate of return to insurance
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[(expected indemnity – premium) / (premium)] had a significant positive effect on
participation. This is consistent with Cannon and Barnett, who found a negative effect of
change in the net cost of insurance on crop insurance participation.
Studies about MPCI purchase decisions since Knight and Coble’s 1997 survey have
tended to focus on a host of other factors, including risk characteristics and farm income
level (Makki and Somwaru, 1999), revealing a relationship between risk and choice of
insurance contract. Makki and Somwaru (2001) went on to analyze longitudinal crop
insurance purchase decision data from 1995 to 1999, identifying factors that influenced
farmers’ choices of crop insurance purchase to varying degrees: risk level, premium
price, premium subsidy, expected indemnity payoffs, availability of alternative insurance
products, and various insurance contract characteristics. A study by Changnon (2004) on
the effects of drought forecasts on crop insurance decisions, based on a survey of
Midwestern (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio) farmers, found that 40% of
respondents changed their coverage based on the drought forecasts. In terms of risk
characteristics, Sherrick et al. (2004) found that farmer-specific reservation insurance
premiums depended on expected rates of return with and without insurance, as well as
farmer-specific levels of risk aversion. Considering data from a 1989 survey, Just, Calvin,
and Quiggin (1999) concluded that “risk aversion is a relatively weak incentive for
participation… [suggesting] that farmers’ asymmetric informational advantages lead to
insuring those operations with higher expected indemnities” (Ramirez and Scott
Shonkwiler 2017).
An analysis of the effect of increased insurance subsidies on land use by Claassen,
Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) determined that in some areas, as crop insurance subsidies
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rose, a greater amount of land was put into production. A study by Babcock and Hart
(2005) specifically examined what effect the subsidy changes related to the 2000
Agriculture and Risk Protection Act (ARPA) had on insurance purchase decisions,
comparing coverage levels before and after ARPA and concluding that purchases of
coverage levels above 65% more than doubled. More recent studies examine the effect
and magnitude of premium subsidies on insurance participation decisions. O’Donoghue
(2014) found that corn insurance demand (measured as liability per acre) increases by
0.13%, nearly doubling depending on region, per percent increase in subsidy per acre.
Similarly, Yu et al. (2018) found that a 10% increase in subsidy per dollar of liability
induced a 0.43% increase in planted acreage.
Much of the literature on crop insurance focuses on participation. While this type of
analysis provides insight about farmers crop insurance purchase decisions and behavior
considering crop insurance subsidies, it fails to reveal much about the strategic
interaction between government (who provides said subsidies) and farmers. More
recently, however, efforts to analyze this in a theoretical framework have been
undertaken (Bulut 2017). This study continues such efforts by examining the interaction
with an empirical analysis of the cases of two specialty crops in South Florida, fresh
market sweet corn and fresh market tomatoes. This study extends the crop insurance
literature in several ways. It casts the three-way strategic interactions between farmers,
insurers and government using a refined theoretical framework, Stackelberg leaderfollower game. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical application of such model to
crop insurance literature. Second, this study addresses a key policy relevant question that
agricultural risk management agencies grapple with. Confronted with uncertain climate,

96

farmers do need an affordable crop insurance program to keep their farming solvent.
Unless there is adequate participation by farmers, insurance program can neither be
affordable nor solvent. Their participation rate, in turn, directly depends on net premium
they pay relative to their reservation premium (i.e., the maximum net premium they are
willing to pay such that they are indifferent to purchase insurance or not). This
reservation premium could depend on farmers’ expectations about climate and business
risks in general. Therefore, it is important for the risk management agency to set premium
and subsidies such that they do not exceed farmers’ reservation premium, in order to
ensure a sustained farmers’ participation in the program. The reservation premium and
subsidy serve as respective ceiling and floor amount, respectively. The model presented
in this develops a rule for empirically estimating such reservation values under varying
climate risk scenario. Third, past research on insurance for specialty crops in the tropics
is limited. South Florida specialty crops provide a unique geographic and insurance
context given that the region is prone to increasing climate risk and crops involved are
high value crops.
4.2. Methods
4.2.1. Delineation of the study area
This study focuses on two specialty crops, fresh market corn and fresh market tomatoes,
in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties in South Florida. According to Ligon (2011),
“Specialty crops, particularly fruits and vegetables, differ in several important respects
from traditional commodity crops in ways which may affect both demand for insurance
and the difficulty of supplying insurance.” For example, spatial shocks (e.g., heavy
precipitation events) which affect production within a relatively small geographical area
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will have a greater effect on aggregate supply than the same shock for a cereal crop,
which is storable and has more geographically dispersed production (Ligon 2011).
The insured liability of specialty crops has been trending upward in recent years (Collins
2012). In 2011, specialty crops accounted for approximately 2.6 percent of total insured
acres, but approximately 10.3 percent of total insured liability. This is due in part to
specialty crops’ high value per acre. Collins (2012) goes on to describe various
challenges in expanding insurance coverage for specialty crops, including the small
acreages of some specialty crops, accurately assessing the effects of weather on crop
production for loss adjustment, and the usual insurance problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard.
As of 2016, Florida ranked first in value of production of fresh market tomatoes,
accounting for 40% of the total U.S. value, and second in value of production of fresh
market sweet corn, accounting for 24% of the total U.S. value (Florida Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services 2017).
Having a subtropical to tropical climate with a wet (warm) season and a dry (cool)
season, cropping season in South Florida for these vegetables typically coincides with the
dry season of October through May. Precipitation patterns in general as well as extreme
precipitation events (in South Florida are found to be significantly correlated with largescale climate effects, including the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), with a 5570 year periodicity; the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), with a 20-30 year periodicity;
and the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), with a 3-7 year periodicity (Gunn 2010;
South Florida Water Management District 2011; Wong et al. 2014). During El Niño
years, the polar jet stream takes a more southerly flow which allows more frontal systems

98

to reach Florida, increasing precipitation particularly in the dry season (South Florida
Water Management District 2011). For the study period of 1989 to 2017, El Niño years
are 1991-92, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2002-07, 2009-10, and 2014-16 (NOAA). The 2014-16
El Niño was particularly strong compared to the rest of the US states (Figure 1), leading
to nearly $3 million in sweet corn and tomato losses in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach
counties.
4.2.2. Game-theoretic models
Game-theoretic methods, both cooperative and non-cooperative, have been widely used
to simulate the strategic behaviors of agents in the contexts of manufacturing (Zhao et al.
2012), engineering (Liu, Ji, and Jiao 2013), environmental policy (Bhat, Alexander, and
English 1998; Sinha et al. 2013; Hong et al. 2017), and
in insurance markets, e.g., natural disaster and crop insurance markets (El-Adaway et al.
2015; O. Mahul 1999; Bulut 2017). Hierarchical market solutions, first introduced by
Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, have been employed to simulate sequential decisionmaking in situations in which one agent has dominating power over the others (von
Stackelberg 1952). Now known as a Stackelberg equilibrium, this sequential game
solution concept involves players with asymmetric roles, one a leader and the other
following. The leader announces their action and the follower responds by choosing their
optimal response given that announcement. The leader, knowing the follower’s objective
function and anticipating the response, chooses the action that optimizes their own
performance given the follower’s rational response. Followers, in order to maximize their
own objective function, decide whether to take certain action. In a crop insurance
market, for instance, farmers as followers would decide which insurance product to
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purchase given the price of insurance premium, their risk factors, and a vector of
economic variables. Government, knowing farmers’ optimal decision, sets the premium
and subsidy levels. The farmers’ dynamic problem will first be developed, and all
necessary conditions derived. These conditions will then be included as constraints in the
development of the government’s dynamic problem, in which it attempts to balance the
income from and flood indemnity claims paid to farmers’ insured crops by insurers.
Interaction between government and farmers is assumed to be non-cooperative, which
can still result in a socially efficient decision strategy under certain possible conditions
(Bhat, Alexander, and English 1998). To this end, a sequential hierarchical game
becomes particularly relevant for simulating the decision behavior of the government as a
price-setter for both premiums and subsidies, and farmers as followers aiming to
maximize their profits given the likelihood of perils.
4.2.2.1 The farmers’ model
We consider a large number (𝑁) of farmers. The farmers’ objective is to maximize net
revenue from agricultural production (market return less production cost), subject to
stochastic peril. Following Duncan and Myers (2000), a typical farmer n of the
population faces the prospect of a loss with probability 𝜃 and no loss with probability
(1 − 𝜃). Farmers are assumed to lack the ability to influence the government’s policy
decision once it is made. Alternatively, they attempt to optimally make their decisions
regarding insurance purchase in response to the government’s decision variable. It is
assumed that farmers are price takers and are in a climatologically homogenous region.
Without the purchase of insurance, an individual farmer n’s total net revenue (TR) is
𝑇𝑅 = 𝐴(1 − 𝜃)𝑅

(1)
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where A is planted acres, R is net revenue per acre, and θ is the expected probability that
a certain peril will occur. With the purchase of insurance, the farmer’s TR will be lowered
by the net premium paid as below,
𝑇𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴[𝜃𝑅𝑗 − (𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗 )]

(2)

where P is the cost of insurance premiums, S is the subsidy for purchase of insurance, and
subindex j is the specific insurance product purchased by the farmer. Following the crop
insurance decision framework of Sherrick et al. (2004), a farmer will decide to purchase
insurance product j if their expected TR (or utility) with insurance is at least as much as
without the insurance. Formally,
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝐴[𝜃𝑅𝑗 − (𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗 )] ≥ 𝐴(1 − 𝜃)𝑅}

(3)

The above inequality can be solved for either the farmer’s maximum willingness to pay
(WTP) for insurance (𝑃𝑗∗ ) or the minimum subsidy (𝑆𝑗∗ ) a farmer is willing to accept
(WTA) to participate in the insurance market. Solving the inequality, the probability that
(𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝑅𝑗 ) ≥ 0 is assumed to yield a linear probability function,
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∆𝑇𝑅𝑗 ≥ 0) = 𝛼𝑋

(4)

where X is a vector of Pj, Sj, Mj, and CCI, and where M represents prior participation and
CCI represents general market conditions. Logit and probit models were also considered,
and ultimately rejected in favor of a linear probability model using a censored Tobit
estimator.
4.2.2.2 The government’s model
Adapting Bulut (2017), a two-stage strategic interaction between the government and
farmers is considered. In the first stage, the government announces the ex ante premium
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and subsidy rates. In the second stage, farmer n makes their insurance purchase decision
by taking these rates as given. Following this, stochastic events unfold, and a loss does or
does not occur. Thus, in this scenario, the government is the natural Stackelberg leader,
making the farmer the follower. In the first stage, the leader (government) solves the
problem of setting premium and subsidy rates by determining how the follower (farmers)
will respond in the second stage.
With symmetric information, the government, the leader of this game, is assumed to set
the price of the premium at the optimal participation price 𝑃𝑗∗ , knowing that the farmerfollowers will optimally decide their participation rate as in (Eq. 4) in response to the
leader’s optimal insurance rate decision and given level of subsidy. That is, the leader
attempts to set the premium 𝑃𝑗∗∗ at a rate that implicitly equates the total premium
payment with expected indemnity payment. Formally, 𝑃𝑗∗∗ can be determined by solving,
𝐶𝑗 𝑃𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗 𝜃𝑅𝑗 = 𝐶𝑗 (𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗 ) = 0

(5)

Subject to (Eq. 4), where 𝐶𝑗 is the extent of area covered by insurance and is a function of
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗), or 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗∗ and total acres (𝐴̅).
That is, 𝐴̅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗∗ (𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗 ) = 0, or,
𝐴̅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗∗ (𝑃𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗 , 𝐶𝐶𝐼)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗 ) = 0

(6)

From (6) above, we can develop a function for the optimal premium 𝑃𝑗∗∗ which will then
determine the optimal participation rates of farmers for insurance product j. 𝑃𝑗∗∗ is the
most that farmers would be willing to pay (reservation premium) at which their return
with and without insurance would be the same. Formally,
𝑃𝑗∗∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡

102

(7)

4.2.3. Estimation of willingness to pay and willingness to accept
Probability of participation (Eq. 4) was estimated as a censored Tobit model, with a lower
limit of 0 and upper limit of 1. Following standard practice (Johnston et al. 2013), the
estimates of WTP (P*) and WTA (S*) were expressed as the ratios of the variable
coefficients to participation coefficient as in (Eq. 4). Formally,
𝑃∗ =

̂0 +𝛽
̂2 𝑆̅+𝛽
̂3 𝑀
̂4 𝐶𝐶𝐼
̂
̅ +𝛽
𝛽
̂
𝛽1

(8)

𝑆∗ =

̂0 +𝛽
̂1 𝑃̅+𝛽
̂3 𝑀
̂4 𝐶𝐶𝐼
̂
̅ +𝛽
𝛽
̂2
𝛽

(9)

And,

Crop insurance and loss data were retrieved from the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency. Crop production and value data were
retrieved from the USDA Census of Agriculture. Sources of weather and climate data
include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Centers
for Environmental Information Climate Data Online and NOAA National Weather
Service Climate Prediction Center. Data were aggregated into a county-level format for
each of the two selected crops, and monthly and annual means were calculated for the
study period. Dollar variables are deflated to 2017 values. All analysis was conducted
using Stata13.
4.3. Results and analysis
4.3.1 Participation
At sample mean levels, estimated likelihood of participation for farmers growing fresh
market sweet corn was 0.7523. Estimates for likelihood participation were higher in
Miami-Dade County than in Palm Beach County, at 0.7821 and 0.7278, respectively.

103

Farmers growing fresh market tomatoes were approximately half as likely to participate
in the insurance market, with overall likelihood at 0.3485. Similarly to sweet corn
farmers, Miami-Dade tomato farmers had a higher likelihood of participation than those
in Palm Beach, at 0.4041 and 0.2498, respectively. Results from Tobit model estimations
of insurance market participation are described in Table 4.1.
Coefficients for premium and subsidy were significant and with expected signs, and for
both sweet corn and tomatoes the subsidy coefficient is nearly twice that of the premium,
indicating that the level of government subsidy is a stronger driver of insurance purchase
decisions than the premium price. Subsidies are on average 55% and 58% of the premium
price over the study period for sweet corn and tomatoes, respectively, and the model
reflects this relationship. Insurance participation in the previous period was positive and
significant, and for both sweet corn and tomatoes was the most influential variable. The
coefficient for CCI was also positive and significant, although more than double for
tomatoes versus sweet corn.
The sample mean per-acre premium price across the study period of 1995 to 2017 for
fresh market tomatoes was $444.56 per acre (in 2017 U.S. dollars), more than quadruple
that of fresh market sweet corn ($100.21 per acre). Sample mean of subsidy in dollar per
acre for sweet corn and tomatoes, deflated to 2017 U.S. dollars, are $55.49 (55.37% of
the average premium) and $258.99 (58.26% of the average premium), respectively.
For fresh market sweet corn, farmers’ maximum WTP for premium was $401.09 in
Miami-Dade and $264.03 in Palm Beach, and $325.84 across both counties. Minimum
subsidy WTA was $29.77, $86.15, and $60.72 across Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and both
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counties, respectively. The percent of reservation subsidy to premium in Miami-Dade
was 7.42% and in Palm Beach was 32.63%, and 18.63% overall across both counties.
Farmers of fresh market tomatoes similarly had a higher WTP for premium in MiamiDade than in Palm Beach, at $1023.35 versus $907.14, and $962.12 overall. Miami-Dade
tomato farmers were WTA a minimum subsidy of $91.33, while in Palm Beach the
minimum was $0. The percent of reservation subsidy to premium was 8.92% in MiamiDade and 0% in Palm Beach, and 3.11% overall.
4.3.2 Leader’s actuarial premium model estimation
Various model specifications for each fresh market sweet corn and fresh market tomatoes
are described in Table 4.2. Variables in the models reflect those that RMA considers for
its derivation of actuarially fair premiums, including expected crop price, expected
participation, expected losses, and expected peril (in this case the specific peril is extreme
precipitation). The optimal fresh market sweet corn premium estimated at the sample
average using Model C2 was $126.79. Using Model T1, the estimated per-acre premium
for maximum participation of fresh market tomato farmers was $508.32.
Maximum WTP and minimum WTA were estimated for premium and subsidy,
respectively, for each county individually as well as for sweet corn and tomatoes overall
and are described in Table 3.
At the reservation premium, or maximum WTP for insuring sweet corn, there is only one
crop year, 2010, in which per-acre indemnity exceeds the per-acre reservation premium
(Figure 4.2). However, the per-acre indemnity exceeds the average annual actual crop
premium several years during the study period. On the contrary, the actual crop premium
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stays much below the maximum reservation premium. For tomatoes, the per-acre
indemnity twice exceeds the maximum per-acre premium, in 2002 and 2012 (Figure 4.3).
The percent of reservation subsidy with respect to premium for sweet corn and tomatoes
overall were 18.63% and 3.11%, respectively. In Miami-Dade, the percent of subsidy was
7.42%, compared to Palm Beach’s 32.63%. This suggests that Palm Beach farmers
demand higher subsidy rates than do Miami-Dade farmers, and Miami-Dade farmers may
be more risk-averse. For tomatoes, however, this is reversed, with Miami-Dade farmers
demanding a higher subsidy rate of 8.92% to 0% for Palm Beach, indicating that Palm
Beach farmers are willing to insure even without subsidies.
4.3.2 Policy and climate simulations
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2014) found that reducing premium
subsidies could potentially save hundreds of millions of dollars in the federal budget,
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the effects this action would have on participation rates. Holding
per-acre premium prices constant, reducing subsidies by 20% lowers participation from
75% to 68% and from 35% to 28% for sweet corn and tomatoes, respectively, at the
highest level of reduction (Table 4). Nearly all years in which per-acre indemnity exceeds
per-acre premiums coincide with occurrences of El Niño (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
4.4. Conclusions
The existing literature primarily looked at farmers’ participation behavior (i.e., response
to insurance premium or subsidy), without looking at the policymaker’s decision. Our
paper is the first to empirically capture the simultaneity of farmers’ and government
decisions through a hierarchical strategic leader-follower game model. Farmers’ crop
insurance participation decision was driven mainly by prior participation and the levels of
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premium and subsidy. The government’s decision was affected by participation levels,
crop price, prior indemnity, and peril, and varied by county. The models yielded optimal
WTP for premium and WTA for subsidy, which have been above the government-set
premium rates.
Actual indemnities from flood and excess moisture have exceeded crop premiums in
several years, and maximum WTP in one year, while per-acre premiums consistently
stayed well below maximum WTP.
As evidenced in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, mean per-acre indemnity resulting from excess
moisture or precipitation sometimes exceeded the mean per-acre premium for both sweet
corn and tomatoes, while the per-acre premium has remained consistently well below
farmers’ maximum WTP. The RMA has been able to set the premium at a low enough
price to encourage participation, while also keeping subsidy rates at a fairly consistent
level, which has caused the per-acre indemnity to exceed the actual premium a number of
times. This demonstrates that the government must be cautious in setting premiums in
response to expected perils. Any government decision to reduce subsidies may adversely
affect the farmers’ decisions and destabilize the overall crop insurance market.
Particularly as climate risks continue to increase, this situation may not sustain the crop
insurance market in the long term, and since the reservation premiums for both sweet
corn and tomatoes are much higher than the actual observed premiums, farmers may be
able to handle higher premium prices than what they are currently paying. However, that
means that RMA must bear a higher subsidy burden, which may be an inevitable policy
choice RMA may have to make in an effort to keep the insurance market afloat.

107

A trend analysis by the South Florida Water Management District (2011) from 19502008 shows a general decrease in wet season precipitation, possibly due to a shortening
or delay of the wet season, but an increase in the number of wet days during the dry
season. Coupled with sea level rise and the attendant need for flood control, a series of
strong El Niño years could prove catastrophic not only for farmers but for insurers.
Reductions in subsidies may also negatively impact insurers. As subsidy rates decline, so
do the corresponding participation rates for a given insurance product.
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Tables
Table 4.1. Tobit regression results, insurance market participation in Miami-Dade
and Palm Beach counties
Fresh Market Sweet Corn

Fresh Market Tomatoes

51

45

44.0313

31.5504

Coefficient (P-value)

Coefficient (P-value)

Per-Acre Premium

-0.0033 (0.00)

-0.0006 (0.03)

Per-Acre Subsidy

0.0064 (0.00)

0.0012 (0.05)

Previous Year Participation

0.5499 (0.00)

0.7343 (0.00)

Consumer Confidence Index

0.0017 (0.02)

0.0037 (0.00)

Constant

0.1151 (0.30)

-0.3473 (0.02)

Observations
Log-Likelihood
Variable
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Table 4.2. Premium regression results
Fresh Market Sweet Corn

Adjusted R Square
Observations
Variable

Model C1

Model C2

Model C3

Model C4

0.93

0.87

0.88

0.22

36

36

36

36

Coefficient
(Std. Error)

0.06236
(0.03778)
0.0384
(0.0080)*
0.10545
(0.9153)
53.18154
(21.8593)**
-123.7143
(9.683)*

Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-42.5014
(65.6348)
0.06248
(0.03814)
0. 0452
(0. 0132)*
0.2892
(0.9666)
72.8229
(37.5099)**
- 123.3320
(9.7931)*

Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-36.7346
(61.8134)
0.06207
(0.03755)
0.04592
(0.0128)**

Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-166.8853
(155.1799)
0.26203
(0.08745)**
0.04896
(0.0327)

70.4319
(36.1067)**
-122.4839
(9.2354)*

126.1255
(91.1857)

Model T1

Model T2

Model T3

Model T4

0.73

0.74

0.01

0.04

36

36

36

36

Coefficient
(Std. Error)

Coefficient
(Std. Error)

0.1537
(0.0902)***
0.02007
(0.0167)
2.4297
(9.0430)
104.85
(174.2490)
80.6564
(97.4179)

0.16188
(0.0836)***
0.02398
(0.0081)*

Coefficient
(Std. Error)
790.0440
(311.0084)**
0.1138
(0.0796)
-0.0264
(0.02123)

Coefficient
(Std. Error)
811.7306
(291.4989)
0.1081
(0.0743)
-0.0266
(0.0209)

93.67687
(166.7427)
89.0560
(90.9182)

-57.4941
(165.2168)
20.0152
(88.3249)

-76.3857
(140.5113)

Intercept
Per-Acre Indemnityt-2
Crop Pricet-1
Extreme Rain Eventt-1
Participationt-1
County Dummy (PB=1)
Fresh Market Tomatoes

Adjusted R Square
Observations
Variable
Intercept
Per-Acre Indemnityt-2
Crop Pricet-1
Extreme Rain Eventt-1
Participationt-1
County Dummy (PB=1)
*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10
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Table 4.3. Maximum premium WTP and minimum subsidy WTA for participation
in crop insurance market, 2017 U.S. $
Overall

Miami-Dade

Palm Beach

Maximum premium WTP

$325.84

$401.09

$264.03

Minimum subsidy WTA

$60.72

$29.77

$86.15

Percent of reservation subsidy to
premium

18.63%

7.42%

32.63%

Maximum premium WTP

$969.12

$1023.35

$907.14

Minimum subsidy WTA

$30.06

$91.33

$0

Percent of reservation subsidy to
premium

3.11%

8.92%

0%

Fresh Market Sweet Corn

Fresh Market Tomatoes

Table 4.4. Participation at various levels of subsidy reduction for Sweet Corn in
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, 2017
Fresh Market Sweet Corn
% Reduction in subsidy

5%

10%

15%

20%

$/acre Reduction in subsidy

2.77

5.54

8.32

11.09

New subsidy per acre

$52.71

$49.94

$47.16

$44.39

Participation rate

73.43%

71.64%

69.84%

68.04%

Table 4.5. Participation at various levels of subsidy reduction for Tomatoes in
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, 2017
Fresh Market Tomatoes
% Reduction in subsidy

5%

10%

15%

20%

12.94

25.89

38.84

51.79

New subsidy per acre

$246.04

$233.09

$220.14

$207.19

Participation rate

33.29%

31.72%

30.16%

28.61%

$/acre Reduction in subsidy
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Figures
Figure 4.1. Percent of average precipitation compared to 1981-2010 average,
January 1996

(Source: https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots)
6Figure 4.2. Per-acre indemnity vs. premium, Fresh Market Sweet Corn 1990-2017
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Figure 4.3. Per-acre indemnity vs. premium, Fresh Market Tomatoes 1991-2017
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